

Total Control: How the Nazis Countered Unconventional Warfare in the Netherlands During World War Two

A Monograph

by

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2017

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. **PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.**

1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 10-04-2017		2. REPORT TYPE Master's Thesis		3. DATES COVERED (From - To) JUN 2016 - MAY 2017	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Total Control: How the Nazis Countered Unconventional Warfare in the Netherlands During World war Two				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) Maj. Jeroen van Rantwijk				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army Command and General Staff College ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301				8. PERFORMING ORG REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) School for Advanced Military Studies, Advanced Military Studies Program.				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT To prevent and counter resistance in the Netherlands during World War Two, the German occupation forces used increasingly harsh measures. Initially the Nazis left the Dutch bureaucracy in place and they followed a relatively lenient occupation strategy. This had the effect of inviting only limited opposition. Some seemingly trivial measures such as additional identification obligations had far-reaching effects on the ability of the security apparatus to control the population. The Dutch were poorly prepared to fight against the Nazi occupation. Experienced German security forces decisively defeated the first Anglo-Dutch unconventional warfare effort. Informants and signals intelligence intercepted incoming operatives before they could do harm. The German counteraction highlighted great intelligence work and interagency cooperation. The many militarized police officers in the German intelligence services used their experience and detective skills and design to wrest the initiative from Special Operations Executive and the young underground movement in the Netherlands. By the final year, when the Nazi's hope of victory had evaporated, the Nazis used terror to subdue resistance. This worked in the short term, but in the longer term, this led to more opposition. In conclusion, German population control worked best when it was least invasive. A police operation ensured the destruction of an Anglo-Dutch unconventional warfare effort. This operation relied heavily on human intelligence obtained by cleverly manipulating opponents and Dutch society. The use of terror to subdue resistance worked in the short term, but in the longer term only led to more opposition.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS Resistance, Unconventional Warfare, Counter-Intelligence, Netherlands, World War Two, Security Warfare.					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON Maj Jeroen van Rantwijk
a. REPORT (U)	b. ABSTRACT (U)	c. THIS PAGE (U)			19b. PHONE NUMBER (include area code) 913-547-6440

Abstract

Total Control: How the Nazis Countered Unconventional Warfare in the Netherlands During World War Two, MAJ Jeroen F van Rantwijk, Royal Netherlands Army, 55 pages.

Based on historical literature and sources, this monograph explored the fight between German occupation forces and the Dutch resistance with its Allied sponsors. The question that guided research was how did the German occupation forces counter unconventional warfare in the Netherlands during World War Two?

To prevent and counter resistance in the Netherlands, the German occupation forces used increasingly harsh measures. Initially the Nazis left the Dutch bureaucracy in place and they followed a relatively lenient occupation strategy. This had the effect of inviting only limited opposition. Some seemingly trivial measures such as additional identification obligations had far-reaching effects on the ability of the security apparatus to control the population. Over time, the malicious character of Nazi occupation showed itself. The oppressive German security warfare as it had evolved over prior decades formed the blueprint for the occupation of the Netherlands during World War Two. This alienated the majority of the Dutch population and attracted a socially isolated minority. By enlisting the help of this despised minority and generally because of increased abuse and deprivation, the Nazi occupation forces lost any claim to legitimacy and fuelled Dutch enmity.

The Dutch were not prepared to fight against the Nazi occupation and experienced German security forces thwarted the first Anglo-Dutch unconventional warfare effort. Informants and signals intelligence intercepted incoming operatives before they could do harm. The German counteraction highlighted great intelligence work and interagency cooperation. The many militarized police officers in the German intelligence services used their experience and detective skills and design to wrest the initiative from Special Operations Executive and the young underground movement in the Netherlands. The usual internal strife within the Nazi security services was absent between the offices that dealt with countering unconventional warfare.

By the final year, the Germans resorted to a complete reign of terror in the Netherlands. With the Allies on the doorstep, the Nazis discouraged resistance or support to it with brutal repression. The methods were deportation to concentration camps, the execution of hostages, the burning of houses, or a combination of all of the above. Terror achieved its purpose on unconventional warfare in the short term. The Allies and the Dutch resistance delayed many offensive actions until liberation was imminent. The Nazi reliance on brutal coercion led to their loss of legitimacy however. In the longer term, terror created an enmity within the Dutch that provided a fertile recruiting ground for resistance. The Germans were never able to win the battle of wills.

In conclusion, German population control worked best when it was least invasive. With control established, a police operation ensured the destruction of an Anglo-Dutch unconventional warfare effort. This operation relied heavily on human intelligence obtained by cleverly manipulating opponents and Dutch society. When the Nazi's hope of victory evaporated, they used terror to subdue resistance. This worked in the short term, but in the longer term, this led to more opposition.

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Acknowledgement

Without the assistance and advice of several fantastic and patient people, this monograph would not exist. Dr. Stephen Bourque allowed me to pursue a hard subject to find proper sources for outside the Netherlands and Germany. Despite his initial reservations, he accepted my obstinacy and proceeded to help me in the most friendly and relaxed manner, always safeguarding the quality of my work. The initial framework for this writing sprang from research under the wings of Dr. Louis DiMarco. His systematic and critical thinking bought me a head start that I could translate into more depth and breadth. We met through his lovely Wife, retired colonel Joyce DiMarco, who also introduced my family to the Fort Leavenworth Hunt. Horse riding and chasing coyotes allowed me to blow off steam after monograph-work, while simultaneously soothing my wife's craving for equestrian pursuit. Fellow-foxhunter colonel (Army of the Republic of France) Nicholas Auboin kindly offered to review my drafts. With his military intelligence expertise, he provided an illuminating perspective. Other help came through the cyber domain. Mr. Willem Mugge's website containing his extensive research on clandestine operations in the Netherlands served as a source of information. When I asked permission to use it, Mr. Mugge not only said yes, but he also volunteered to comment on my research. He caught multiple mistakes and made several valuable recommendations. My father joined my research team early on. Gifted with a great historical memory and owning a substantial private library, he was able to suggest relevant input and screen multiple sources that I would have otherwise missed. He also pre-read numerous pages, and visited archives, saving me many hours. The first ones to support me were my wife Chantal and my children Willem and Roos. The countless hours I spent working upstairs in my study, I seemed home, but I was not really. They all had to work harder so dad could get smarter. Thank you all ever so much.

Acronyms

BBO	<i>Bureau Bijzondere Opdrachten</i> Special Missions Bureau (Dutch)
DF	Direction Finding
OD	<i>Ordedienst</i> Order Service (Dutch)
ORPO	<i>Ordnungspolizei</i> Order Police (German)
OSS	Office of Strategic Services
SAS	Special Air Service
SD	<i>Sicherheitsdienst</i> Security Service (German)
SIPO	<i>Sicherheitspolizei</i> Security Police (German)
SOE	Special Operations Executive
SOF	Special Operations Forces
SS	<i>Schutzstaffel</i> Bodyguard (German)
RSHA	<i>Reichssicherheitshauptamt</i> the Reich's Main Security Department (German)
UW	Unconventional Warfare

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Introduction

Night Jump

During the moonlit night of October 1 and 2 1942, Agent Arie van der Giessen, a trained saboteur and wireless operator, jumped through a hole in the bottom of the fuselage of a converted bomber. Within a few moments, the parachute had carried him back to his native soil in the Netherlands.¹ Just minutes after landing, Arie linked up with a Dutch resistance reception party and exchanged the pre-arranged passwords for verification. His compatriots helped him bury his parachute and collect some containers full of supplies that accompanied him. Elated from the jump and the fact that his clandestine life had just begun in earnest, Arie was happy to chat with the resistance fighters, who brought him up to date on life under Nazi-occupation, while asking him questions about his mission, his life in England and whether he was using his real name or a cover. After about an hour of work on the drop zone, the resistance fighters started off to a nearby barn to hide the supplies. While Arie struggled out of his jump-overall, the two men behind him suddenly jumped and handcuffed Arie before he could either use his pistol or bite his lethal tablet.² The bomber that had dropped the agent experienced a similar sudden reversal of fortune. Warned by the Nazi-reception party that the prize was secure, the *Luftwaffe* control station released a night fighter that shot the plane down. The Germans had tracked it from the moment it took off in England.³

The saboteur had parachuted straight into the hands of the Nazis and their collaborators. During his interrogation, the Germans displayed so much knowledge about his training and preparation, that treason in England seemed the only explanation. Among Arie's equipment, the Germans discovered a flashlight containing Dutch money and false identity-papers for another

¹ Michael Foot, *SOE in the Low Countries* (London: St Ermin's Press, 2001), 142-143.

² Foot, *SOE in the Low Countries*, 137.

³ Hermann Giskes, *London Calling North Pole* (London: Kimber, 1953), 121.

resistance member. Shortly after, a Dutch collaborator helped the Nazis arrest that man by impersonating the newly parachuted agent, using the torch as guarantee. The Germans had penetrated another illegal network, and the resistance and intelligence collection in the occupied Netherlands received another blow. Arie van der Giessen was one of the fifty-four agents that fell victim to the Germans called the *Englandspiel*, meaning England-game. It was counted as the biggest counter-intelligence success of the Nazis in World War Two.

At the time Arie van der Giessen parachuted, the maps and reports in the Special Operations Executive (SOE) Dutch section in London still showed one of the most successful Allied clandestine operations.⁴ Reality was that the Nazis had the British and the Dutch completely fooled. The Netherlands resistance, already at a disadvantage by the nature of their country and a poor preparation for war, suffered a major setback through the German infiltration of the British special warfare operation. The Nazi infiltration of the British SOE with its disastrous effect on the Dutch resistance showed how the Nazis successfully countered Allied unconventional warfare in this theater. The Germans called this episode the *Englandspiel*, which means England game. This is only one example of the Nazis countering unconventional warfare and resistance. In the five years of occupation, multiple Allied organizations attempted to mount unconventional operations. Overall, the results were meagre. This monograph will explore the unconventional war behind the lines in the Netherlands.

Context

On May 10, 1940, Nazi Germany invaded the Netherlands as part of their operation *Fall Gelb*. After five days of fighting and the terror bombing of the city of Rotterdam, the Netherlands capitulated and faced an increasingly painful German occupation until liberated in May 1945. The Netherlands government had hoped that the Germans would respect Dutch neutrality once again,

⁴ Foot, *SOE in the Low Countries*, 193.

despite warning signs of the opposite.⁵ The trust in neutrality coupled with their reluctance to fund and maintain effective armed forces made for a nation that was entirely unprepared for war. Even if the Netherlands armed forces had been strong, a prolonged defense on Dutch terrain had become unfeasible with the advent of modern warfare due to a geography that does not provide any strategic depth. The German war machine made this painfully evident when they overran the archaic Dutch defenses, though heroic at times, in five days. On May 13, the head of state, Queen Wilhelmina, her cabinet of ministers and the gold of the Bank of the Netherlands evacuated to London on British warships to continue as a Netherlands government in exile.⁶

If the Dutch had been woefully unprepared for the German invasion, they were even less prepared for a clandestine war against their oppressors. Espionage, sabotage, assassination and attacks were hard to stage in the occupied Netherlands because of the characteristics and geography of the country. Some nine million people lived in an area of 33,000 square kilometers. Virtually all the land was built-up or cultivated; woods and similar areas making up only seven percent. Most of this country was perfectly flat. Excellent roads, railways and telephone lines connected even the smallest villages and the abundance of watery obstacles forced all to remain road bound. The geography and infrastructure allowed the two to three German divisions and a few police regiments to be anywhere in the Netherlands within a few hours. The occupation forces watched the Dutch North Sea coast closely, and only a few Dutchmen succeeded in escaping to Britain in small boats and canoes. Perhaps no other country could be held in a state of subjection by so few occupying troops.⁷ The first type of resistance worthy of the title consisted of illegal press, helping downed allied pilots, espionage and occasional sabotage and assassination. No one coordinated this first Dutch opposition. It was often reckless and always quickly subdued by the Germans.

⁵ Louis de Jong, *Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de Tweede Wereldoorlog Deel 2* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969), 357.

⁶ De Jong, *Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden Deel 3*, 283-284.

⁷ Louis de Jong, *The Netherlands and Nazi Germany* (Harvard: University Press, 1990), 31.




Figure 1. The Netherlands on the eve of five days of battle followed by five years of occupation, dispositions before the German invasion of 10 May 1940.

Source: West Point Department of History, accessed on February 14, 2017,

<http://www.westpoint.edu/history/SiteAssets/SitePages/World%20War%20II%20Europe/WWIIEurope10.gif>.

Unconventional warfare efforts over the course of the war in the occupied Netherlands were diverse. The first attempt from London's SOE to instigate a Dutch uprising was a complete failure, which led to the neutralization of almost any effective resistance until 1943. Separate from this British operation, a handful of escaped Dutch soldiers and students managed to infiltrate back

into the Netherlands. This short-lived operation designated *Contact Holland* was discontinued when the men refused to be amalgamated into the larger effort; they had no trust in the operational security measures. The American Office of Strategic Services (OSS) inserted one team of its own into the Netherlands to coincide with airborne operation Market-Garden. Later, an additional single Dutch OSS-man parachuted in to support the final push from the Netherlands into Germany with intelligence.⁸ Still other unconventional warfare originated from the combined teams of SOE and OSS, the Jedburghs. These teams specifically supported larger operations such as Market-Garden and the final liberation of the Netherlands in 1945.⁹ Even the Soviets had one or two agents behind the lines in the Netherlands although they did not achieve much.¹⁰

From a German perspective, the Netherlands provided good sea and air bases for operations against England, and the Nazis considered the Dutch people ethnically very close to “the master race.” The Netherlands would therefore have the honor to be integrated into the “Greater Germanic Reich.”¹¹ The Dutch did not see it that way. They felt profoundly insulted by the occupation, and the number of Nazi sympathizers disappointed the Germans. The German racial rationale mostly did not resonate and the totalitarian character of the German regime went squarely against the Dutch liberal nature. The German goal of turning the Netherlands into a Nazi state largely failed.¹² Counter-unconventional warfare for the Nazis was a necessity to maintain an effective rear that contributed to frontline operations and allowed for the execution of Nazification of occupied territory.

⁸ Patrick O’Donnell, *Operatives, Spies and Saboteurs* (New York: Free Press, 2004), 214.

⁹ Jelle Hooiveld, *Operatie Jedburgh: Geheime Geallieerde Missies in Nederland 1944-1945* (The Hague: Boom, 2014), 10-11.

¹⁰ Foot, *SOE in the Low Countries*, 40.

¹¹ Gerhard Hirschfeld, *Nazi Rule and Dutch Collaboration* (New York: Berg, 1988), 31.

¹² Werner Warmbrunn, *The Dutch under German Occupation 1940-1945* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963), 263.

Methodology

The subject of counter- unconventional warfare in the occupied Netherlands dealt with the interplay of Allied special warfare organizations and the Dutch resistance. Contemporary German doctrine termed this kind of warfare *kleinkrieg*, small war. This could involve partisan or peoples' warfare, one involving the support of military action, the other being political in nature.¹³ Useful literature on the topic focused on either German partisan-fighting, Allied unconventional warfare or on German counter-intelligence, but not on the combination of all three. Multiple points of view that were thus far separated needed to be combined, since countering unconventional warfare also concerned targeting the cooperation of allied agents and resistance movements, in addition to fighting the separate parts. One positive exception in Dutch World War Two history writing is the *Englandspiel* literature. This episode combines all three ingredients. Accounts of the *Englandspiel* are available from the British, Dutch and German sides. Most useful were the memoirs of Hermann Giskes and Joseph Schreieder, the two key German figures in the *Englandspiel*. These came closest to describing what we would now call counter-unconventional warfare as they recount a combination of intelligence and police work.¹⁴ Memoirs of the few surviving secret agents such as Pieter Dourlein, Huib Lauwers and Wim van der Veer provided an inside view from the opposite side. They shed light on how the Germans exploited weaknesses in the Allied-Dutch approach.¹⁵

After the *Englandspiel* literature, sources that deal with the subject dried up. The Nazi counter-unconventional warfare effort in this later timeframe had to be pieced together from the three separate literature subjects. Information about the Dutch resistance, the allied special warfare

¹³ Charles Melson, *German Counterinsurgency Revisited* (Calgary: Journal of Military and Strategic Studies Volume 14, Issue 1, Fall 2011), 1-2. Accessed March 17, 2017, www.jmss.org.

¹⁴ Giskes, *London Calling North Pole*; Joseph Schreieder, *Het Englandspiel* (Amsterdam: van Holkema & Warendorf, 1949).

¹⁵ Wim van der Veer, *Voor het Vaderland weg* (Haarlem: Gottmer, 1996); Pieter Dourlein, *Inside North Pole* (London: William Kimber, 1953); Huib Lauwers, in Giskes, "Epilogue," *London Calling North Pole* (London: Kimber, 1953).

organizations and the German occupation forces that had been written to describe these separate fights, needed to be integrated using counter-unconventional warfare as the new lens. Primary sources such as speeches and proclamations of authorities explained the Dutch and Nazi strategic positions. Wartime telegrams between covert operatives and their leadership showed discussion about how to deal with German counteractions. Valuable secondary sources were available in larger numbers. For anyone researching the Netherlands during World War Two, there is no way around Netherlands historian Dr. Louis de Jong's life's work. His massive work of twenty-nine books of several hundred pages each, contained invaluable detail that allowed for re-interpretation through the counter-unconventional warfare context.¹⁶ De Jong is well-respected, although he has been criticized. Fellow historians of a newer generation such as Ad van Liempt argue he over-emphasized resistance while under-emphasizing the less heroic Dutch-Nazi collaboration. He also tended to think in good and bad, leaving out the vast grey space in war.¹⁷ Perspectives from both historians and two German scholars, Hirschfeld and Warmbrunn found their places in this monograph.¹⁸

For a general context about the Nazi-state, William Shirer's *Rise and Fall of the Third Reich* served as a starting point.¹⁹ For the origins and workings of German security warfare, Philip Blood's Hitler's *Bandit Hunters* was a great source. He described the organization, doctrine and exploits of the German security forces fighting resistances as well as purging "unwanted elements" in the "liberated" rear.²⁰ For the Allied perspective, Michael Foot's works on the SOE were the most important. The official historian of the SOE waited until the British official secrets act

¹⁶ Louis de Jong, *Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de Tweede Wereldoorlog Delen I t/m 10* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1961-1982).

¹⁷ Ad van Liempt, *De Jacht Op Het Verzet* (Amsterdam: Balans, 2013).

¹⁸ Werner warmbrunn, *The Dutch under German occupation 1940-1945* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963); Gerhard Hirschfeld, *Nazi Rule and Dutch Collaboration* (New York: Berg, 1988).

¹⁹ William Shirer, *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich* (New York: Simon & Shuster, 1959).

²⁰ Philip Blood, *Hitler's Bandit Hunters* (Washington: Potomac Books, 2006).

released the relevant files, before he finished his book *SOE in the Low Countries*.²¹ The history of the Dutch special warfare organization *Bureau Bijzondere Opdrachten* (BBO), meaning office of special missions, as well as that of the Jedburghs in the Netherlands, complete the picture of unconventional warfare towards the liberation of the Netherlands. Both organizations only became active in 1944.²² Theories of war, civil violence, morality in warfare, as well as modern doctrine intentionally stayed out of the historical case study, but served to add to the conclusion. Questions arose while researching these memoirs and secondary sources. Where did the German counter-intelligence officers learn their trade? Which Nazi-officer made the decisions during the *Englandspiel*? Did the Nazis catch many secret agents and resistance fighters during random searches? Did the execution of hostages deter resistance?

In the five years of painful Nazi-occupation the initial Dutch resistance was quickly neutralized, the subsequent British effort ended with the disastrous *Englandspiel* and the final unconventional operations in support of the liberation also suffered high losses at the hands of the Germans. Even for a country that was poorly suited and prepared to fight a clandestine war against its occupation force, these results for the unconventional warfare effort seem disappointing. How did this come to be? Was it that impossible to conduct unconventional warfare in the Netherlands? Were the Allied and resistance efforts so poorly organized? Alternatively, were the Nazis so superior at countering it? The central question that guided this research was: how did the German occupation forces counter unconventional warfare in the Netherlands during World War Two? The answer to this question will uncover the characteristics of the German effort against unconventional warfare and it will reveal its strengths and weaknesses.

²¹ Foot, *SOE in the Low Countries*, 8.

²² Jelle Hooiveld, *Operatie Jedburgh: Geheime Geallieerde Missies in Nederland 1944-1945* (The Hague: Boom, 2014); Eddy de Roever, *Zij Sprongen Bij Maanlicht* (Baarn: Hollandia, 1985).

Possible answers to the central question that immediately came to mind were that the Nazi repression discouraged most resistance. The Germans executed hostages as retribution for unconventional warfare and resistance across occupied Europe. Accounts similar to the infamous massacres in Lidice in Czechoslovakia and Oradour-sur-Glane in France existed in the Netherlands. The mass execution of 117 hostages at Woeste Hoeve was the saddest example for the Dutch. Tales of curfews, check points and house searches were also common and could have contributed to stemming the influence of UW. Most Dutchmen will have seen the movie "The Soldier of Orange" which was largely based on true events. It provided additional clues, showing how the Germans pressed Dutchmen into betraying Allied agents, radio direction finding technology pinpointing their exact location, and torture revealing the rest of the resistance-network.²³ If this somber initial line up of answers turned out to be all there is, then the relevancy for our current C-UW might be limited, except for ethics considerations.

As it turns out, there is more to it. The German occupation forces in the Netherlands initially treaded relatively lightly during World War Two. They left many of the Dutch authorities in place and did not give much reason for resistance. A hastily organized Anglo-Dutch unconventional warfare attempt between 1941 and 1943 failed. Contrary to their habit, the inter-agency cooperation between the German organizations tasked with countering unconventional warfare was excellent in the Netherlands. Their detective-like intelligence operations were superior during the *Englandspiel*. Over time the Nazi occupation became more repressive, which sowed animosity. Terror measures such as public hostage executions to retaliate against sabotage and subversion were a double-edged sword, like all un-ethical action. It deterred resistance, but also created additional enmity.

²³ *Soldier of Orange*, directed by Paul Verhoeven (London: The Rank Organization, 1977).

The Nazis' Iron Grip

The German forces in the Netherlands deployed a security operation to both prevent and fight opposition and to exploit the new territory for the Third Reich. The occupation force evolved from relatively non-intrusive to extremely oppressive between 1940 and 1945. The Nazi security operation in the occupied Netherlands was the standard solution that the Germans had developed before the war. The security apparatus always had the same answer for new challenges: increase the iron grip on the Dutch. Between the invasion in 1940 and the liberation in 1945, one discerns mutually influencing actions, reactions and counteractions between occupation force and resistance.

The first action was the German invasion and occupation of the Netherlands. The historical German solution for occupied territory additionally overwhelmed the Dutch who had just fought and lost their first war in a century. Hitler's strategic aim was to Nazify the Netherlands. Once a part of the *Reich*, he would have the Dutch Jews purged and the Netherlands economic potential, including its labor force, put fully at the Reich's disposal.²⁴ Hitler appointed *Reichskommissar* Seyss Inquart as his personal commissioner for the Netherlands. The *Führer* issued a decree, which installed his commissioner and subordinated the Dutch authorities under him and the German police.²⁵ The document was almost identical to the one used for Norway. Hitler opted for a civil administration instead of a military one, because he expected Nazification of the Netherlands to require more guile and perseverance than his generals possessed.²⁶ Seyss Inquart realized that an incremental approach had the best chance of acceptance by the Dutch, so he decided on a gradual "self-Nazification" process for the Netherlands. He published his initial policy in Dutch and German in an order regulation. It stated the consanguinity between Germans and Dutchmen, praised their common bravery in the past battle and announced the need for cooperation from the Dutch

²⁴ Louis de Jong, *The Netherlands and Nazi Germany* (Harvard: University Press, 1990), 33.

²⁵ Adolf Hitler, *Erlass des Führers über Ausübung der Regierungsbefugnisse in den Niederlanden* (Führerhauptquartier: 18 May 1940), 1.

²⁶ de Jong, *Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden Deel 4 band 1*, 30.

administration and legal apparatus, which would remain in place.²⁷ He also made the goodwill gesture of allowing most Dutch army personnel to return home after they disarmed, instead of imprisoning them.

The operation of rolling out the Nazi security network began. Security warfare had evolved along with the rise of the Prussian empire. The security organizations had their roots in the civilian police and worked to secure occupied areas alongside the German rear-area system, the beat-police collaborators, prefects and mayors.²⁸ The introduction of integrated operational intelligence, counterintelligence, policing with secured perimeters and guard networks, and border control were beginning to take shape in German security policy since 1866. Following the German victories of 1939-1940, Hitler granted Himmler authority over law and order, and the right to use all means required. Himmler's vehicle was the *Reichssicherheitshauptamt* (RSHA) security staff. It coordinated far reaching civil control, counter-espionage and sabotage, and investigations into any violations against the regime in the occupied zones.²⁹ As one of the primary efforts of the British between 1940 and 1943 was covert warfare, the countering of this warfare was included in the tasks for the Nazi security services.³⁰ Combating these bandits was a joint operation between the *Ordnungspolizei* (ORPO), the order police, and *Wehrmacht*. The supporting roles of intelligence collection, conducting interrogation and punishment were for the *Sicherheitsdienst* (SD) and *Sicherheitspolizei* (SIPO). Doctrine prescribed aggressive counteraction using hunting teams led by SD and SIPO, with local collaborators working as agent provocateurs. If local residents had aided bandits, or were uncooperative, then the procedures sanctioned retaliations.³¹ Himmler entrusted the loyal, hardworking and ruthless police officer Hans Albin Rauter with the SS-generalship in

²⁷ Seyss Inquart, *Oproep aan het Nederlandsche volk* (Führerhauptquartier, 25 May 1940), 1.

²⁸ Philip Blood, *Hitler's Bandit Hunters* (Washington: Potomac Books, 2006), 12-13.

²⁹ Blood, *Hitler's Bandit Hunters*, 46.

³⁰ Ibid., 66-67.

³¹ Ibid., 85-86.

charge of all security in the Netherlands. He immediately pressed the Dutch police into service. Most police men cooperated reluctantly, some enthusiastically, some played both sides and some resisted.³²

The tactics of the security operation involved population control measures such as a curfew, additional identification obligations, out-of bounds areas and close monitoring of the electromagnetic spectrum. The Nazi occupation administration introduced new identification documents and mandatory registration for all Dutchmen to establish tighter accountability in the newly acquired "province." Registration revealed risk categories and "unwanted elements" within the Dutch population. Risk categories included people with skills that could be used against the regime, such as soldiers, police officers, journalists, intelligentsia and medical personnel. The new identification document, known as the *persoonsbewijs* contained a photo, fingerprint and personal information. It was extremely hard to forge, thanks to the efforts of the diligent but naive Dutch civil servant who designed it, and it proved a formidable control tool.³³ Occupation forces sealed off sensitive areas such as the Dutch coastline, airfields and military installations and covered every meter of Dutch airspace with radar. In 1941, Hitler's Chief of Staff Wilhelm Keitel signed an order that directed increased Dutch coastal defenses, to include measures to keep the civilian population from rendering help to any incursion.³⁴ Early in the war, the occupation forces installed a curfew. These measures kept resistance fighters at bay from their potential targets and denied them the advantageous hours of darkness for operations. The Germans also tightly controlled the electromagnetic spectrum. Direction finding (DF) technology determined the location of any transmitter. The Berlin and Paris interception stations constantly monitored every wavelength and it

³² Jos Breukers, *Politie en Bezettingstijd*, accessed February 14, 2017, <http://www.politiemuseum.nl/thema.php?tid=15>, 31.

³³ Louis de Jong, *Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de Tweede Wereldoorlog Deel 5a* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1972), 454.

³⁴ Wilhelm Keitel, *Oberkommando der Wehrmacht Nr.: 00590/41 g.k.* (Washington: National Archives and Records Service, Records of the German Army High Command, 1941, Microfilm).

took only twenty to thirty minutes to locate an active transmitter in Western Europe using first general triangulation, narrowed down by unmarked vans with detector equipment and finally using dismantled portable equipment concealed under a raincoat for pinpointing.³⁵ The monitoring of British radio frequencies played a role too. The afternoon pre-flight radio checks at Tempsford airfield, which the Germans knew was the base for the Royal Air Force Squadron that enabled night parachute drops, alerted them to pending operations.³⁶

The Dutch and Allied leadership reacted slowly to the Nazi occupation and with disjointed strategies. A Dutch government in-exile set up in London under Queen Wilhelmina. She announced that with the government in-exile still controlling the Dutch Indies, the colonies and all free Dutchmen would continue the fight against the axis powers.³⁷ Wilhelmina had already issued a proclamation on the day of her arrival in England, instructing the civil government apparatus in the Netherlands to continue to do anything that was of interest to the population. Initially they were to collaborate with the oppressor to maintain order and quiet.³⁸ For many Dutchmen, this meant that they could continue to do their jobs, do business with the same people as before and generally have a clean conscience. The added advantage was that real Nazis did not enter the system as much.³⁹ Subsequent speeches by the Dutch government in-exile reflected caution.

³⁵ Michael Foot, *SOE 1940-46* (United States of America: University Publications, 1986), 106-107.

³⁶ Bernard O'Connor, *Return to Holland*, accessed December 13, 2016, <https://books.google.com/books?id=61zQAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA1&lpg=PA1&dq=bernard+o%27connor+return+to+holland&source=bl&ots=kVIDv8Oud&sig=6xOypW1BQXCLUFKyGFdQuQwzrlg&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiW6deF3ZXTAhWO3oMKHJEDYQQ6AEIKzAD#v=onepage&q=bernard%20o%27connor%20return%20to%20holland&f=false>, 36.

³⁷ Queen Wilhelmina van Oranje, *Radiospeech on BBC "Radio Orange"*, London: 25 May 1940.

³⁸ Queen Wilhelmina van Oranje, *Proclamatie van 13 Mei 1940*, accessed December 13, 2016, <http://www.go2war2.nl/artikel/2239/Proclamaties-Koningin-Wilhelmina.htm?page=3..>

³⁹ Hirschfeld, *Nazi Rule and Dutch Collaboration*, 317.

Prime Minister Pieter Sjoerds Gerbrandy called for spiritual resistance, rejection of Nazi propaganda and giving Germans and traitors a cold shoulder. He warned however, that to shed blood would be premature.⁴⁰ Queen Wilhelmina expressed similar ideas; while commending passive resistance, she urged Dutchmen not to undertake any rash action.⁴¹ The Queen and her cabinet had little information about the occupied homeland after their hasty departure. Their initial strategy was therefore to gain a better information position.⁴² Eventually, preparations would be made for a return. In the meantime, the Dutch in exile would assist British forces as long as that did not needlessly aggravate the situation for the population of the Netherlands. The government in exile did support one aspect of clandestine life promptly. It stood as guarantee for a secret fund that started out as support for Dutchmen that had lost their income because of the German occupation. Later all additional resistance activities were funded through this system. Government-authorized disbursements, secretly tracked through coded receipts thus bankrolled patriotic activities. Although the Nazis arrested and killed several members of the “Bank of the Resistance” during the five-year occupation, it remained functional.⁴³

A few blocks away from Queen Wilhelmina in London, Winston Churchill and his chiefs of staff concluded that stimulating the seeds of revolt within the conquered territories was one of the few feasible methods for England to fight Germany, for the time being. In July 1940, Churchill directed the raising of secret organization SOE to “set Europe ablaze” using sabotage, subversion and promotion of resistance in what we would now call an unconventional warfare campaign.⁴⁴

⁴⁰ Pieter Sjoerds Gerbrandy, *Speech on BBC Radio, London: 3 April 1941*, in Landgenoten, De Radiotoespraken van Minister-President Prof. Mr. P.S. Gerbrandy in de jaren 1940-1945 (Franeker: Uitgeverij T. Wever, 1985), 38.

⁴¹ Queen Wilhelmina van Oranje, *Radiospeech on BBC “Radio Orange”*, London: 28 November 1941.

⁴² Erik Hazelhoff Roelfzema, *Op Jacht Naar Het Leven* (Utrecht: Het Spectrum 2000), 130.

⁴³ Werner warmbrunn, *The Dutch under German occupation 1940-1945* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963), 200.

⁴⁴ Edward Cookridge, *Set Europe Ablaze* (New York: Thomas Y. Cromwell Company, 1967), 2.

Quite contrary to the Netherlands strategy, the Brits envisioned SOE's "Dutch section" to quickly train and equip a guerrilla force, which would create havoc in the Netherlands. This would alleviate pressure from other fronts. The unconventional warfare operation to achieve the British strategic goal of an uprising entailed parachuting fifty-four saboteurs, resistance-organizers and wireless operators into the Netherlands with the mission to link up with existing opposition and lead a campaign of sabotage and subversion. The story of the *Englandspiel*, the German operation that destroyed the SOE in the Netherlands between 1941 and 1943, follows in the next section. The Dutch *Contact Holland* group was the only group to infiltrate an agent to collect intelligence for the government in-exile successfully in the first year. The result was limited however and the exfiltration of the agent failed, forcing him to take a long route back via Switzerland and Spain.⁴⁵ A few individual Dutchmen spontaneously engaged in sabotage and espionage, but the occupation force crushed the uncoordinated and amateurish effort quickly.

Because of its lower profile, illegal press was easier to pursue and became widespread early. Even within the first year, Dutchmen illegally produced sixty-two different publications amounting to around fifty-seven thousand printings. In 1941, the number of illegal papers rose to a hundred and twenty. Some of the bigger papers had underground printers that turned out twelve thousand copies per edition.⁴⁶ The Dutch underground press directly stimulated resistance, but moreover kept the idea of an eventual Nazi defeat alive among a majority. Some of the publications were instructional to life in the underground and contained security tips. Later, specific resistance groups would have their own ideologically aligned illegal press.⁴⁷ The other way to keep informed and inspired was secretly listening to the BBC on a hidden radio.⁴⁸

⁴⁵ Paul van Beckum, *Oranjestad* (Naarden: Strengolt's Boeken, 1992), 159.

⁴⁶ de Jong, *Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden 5b*, 805

⁴⁷ Warmbrunn, *The Dutch under German occupation*, 221

⁴⁸ de Jong, *Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden 5a*, 19.

The tactics needed for operatives to overcome the Nazi occupation force focused on getting in to the Netherlands, not being caught and getting intelligence out. Sneaking in to the occupied Netherlands was hard. Only *Contact Holland* had success via the coast. They did have to undertake numerous unsuccessful dangerous trips for every successful one, to the point of proving the unfeasibility of the concept.⁴⁹ An attempted infiltration by French Marine Commandos in 1944 turned into a disaster. All six men that made it ashore died. The other way into the Netherlands was by parachute, but that was dangerous too. The special duties squadron that dropped secret agents and supplies lost a disproportionate amount of aircraft over the Netherlands, one in six flights. 138 Special Duties Squadron lost eighty-three members on missions to the Netherlands.⁵⁰ The RAF therefore discontinued operations between May 1943 and March 1944.⁵¹ After The SOE and their new Dutch partner-organizations made a new start in 1944, the attrition rate was even worse. Air defenses shot down half the planes, most with the agents still in them. The SOE leadership called a meeting with the BBO to consider cancellation again, but they decided to continue.⁵² Once in occupied territory, defeating checkpoints and patrols required false identity documents. First production started in the autumn of 1941.⁵³ A Dutch resistance group specialized in forgery stole the unique paper and ink of the newly introduced ID, but even with that, they never could produce anything withstanding more than a cursory look.⁵⁴ The professional forgers of the SOE never managed to replicate the *persoonsbewijs* either, sending agents down with pitifully worthless copies.⁵⁵ The bogus resistance reception parties of the *Englandspiel* had a believable point when

⁴⁹ Hazelhoff Roelfzema, *Op Jacht Naar Het Leven*, 142.

⁵⁰ O'Connor, *Return to Holland*, 37.

⁵¹ Michael Foot, *SOE in the Low Countries*, 175.

⁵² Eddy de Roever, *Zij Sprongen Bij Maanlicht*, 83.

⁵³ Louis de Jong, *Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden 5b*, 792.

⁵⁴ Louis de Jong, *Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden 5a*, 453.

⁵⁵ Foot, *SOE*, 131.

they argued for an agent's papers and real name. The Allies did not solve the problems of getting weapons into occupied territory and defeating the tight German hold of the electromagnetic spectrum in the first round of unconventional warfare, as the case in the next section will show.

Regarding the action and reaction sequence, The Dutch and the Germans were not yet on a ram-course in the first year. The occupation force was still somewhat tolerant and the Nazis mostly worked through the intact Dutch bureaucracy. As long as the Germans followed this relatively non-intrusive policy, there seemed not much more reason to complain than before. There was no aggressive Dutch strategy from the government- in exile and an organized Dutch underground did not exist yet. The first German security measures prevented resistance rather than having to counter it. Had the Nazi's kept the level of oppression limited like in the first months of the occupation, reasons for resistance might have remained minimal for many Dutchmen. But the character of the Nazi ideology and the blueprint of German security warfare dictated otherwise. The aggressive Anglo-Dutch unconventional warfare operation not only failed abysmally in itself, but it also put the Nazis on edge for the next round of fighting.⁵⁶

The Nazi counteraction after about a year of occupation was not solely in reaction to the first round of Anglo-Dutch resistance, but also a function of the initial planned transformation of the Netherlands into a province of the "*Reich*" and the reversal of fortune in the war. Implementation of more oppressive measures followed. Nazi strategy for the occupied Netherlands did not change, except that the Germans stripped anything useful from occupied territory, including men for labor, as the deteriorating war effort required. In 1941, the Nazis started deporting the first Dutch Jews to concentration camps. Between mid-1942 into early 1943, both the Nazi repression and growing anti-Nazi resistance led to increased bitterness between the Dutch and the occupation regime.⁵⁷

⁵⁶ Van Liempt, *De Jacht op het Verzet*, 18-19.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 23.

The German security operation became harsher. People from the unpopular Dutch Nazi minority replaced more and more reluctant Dutchmen with important positions like mayors. In February 1943, the fall of Stalingrad emboldened the opposition in the Netherlands. The Germans reacted to the assassinations of key Dutch Nazis by rounding up and interning around two thousand young men, mostly students.⁵⁸ Seyss-Inquart also revoked the pardon for Dutch soldiers. He summoned the roughly three hundred thousand demobilized Dutch soldiers to report for forced labor in Germany.⁵⁹ This was partly to punish the Dutch for the assassination but also to remove potential military-trained opposition from the scene. The *Englandspiel* and the crackdown on the first round of resistance had revealed the involvement of many Dutch former service members.

To staff the population control measures, the persecution of the Jews and the hunt for resistance fighters, the Nazi security apparatus recruited Dutchmen. They brought language skills and local knowledge while sparing German soldiers for frontline service. Some organizations like the *railwacht*, or railwatch, which Rauter stood up in 1942 to prevent railroad sabotage, did not do much harm to society and the resistance effort, but several police and militia units and offshoots did.⁶⁰ The Nazis were not satisfied with the organization and collaboration of the Netherlands police force, which therefore underwent multiple reorganizations. A new Nazi police-training center for young pro-Nazi Dutchmen arose. This school soon became synonym for police terror and the worst form of collaboration with the occupying power.⁶¹ A socially isolated Dutch Nazi minority was prepared to commit legalized crimes sometimes more inhuman than the Germans. Many of them were “blood money hunters” in the auxiliary police.⁶²

⁵⁸ de Jong, *Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden 6 tweede helft*, 612-618. Resistance fighters shot three collaborating Dutchmen: General Seyffardt, Secretary General of Information Mr. Reydon and his wife, and SS-man Feitsma jr.

⁵⁹ de Jong, *Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden 6 tweede helft*, 793.

⁶⁰ de Jong, *Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden 10a eerste helft*, 107.

⁶¹ Hirschfeld, *Nazi Rule and Dutch Collaboration*, 168.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 178.

In addition to the Nazified police, the Germans raised a militia to bolster security. This idea was not new or specific to the Netherlands. There was a Prussian tradition after 1813 to use older reservists for security duties in the *Landwehr*, a territorial militia, to ensure protection against *franc-tireur* activity.⁶³ The Dutch *Landwacht*, meaning land watch, consisted of the worst Dutch society had to offer. By the summer of 1944, twelve to thirteen hundred Dutch Nazi-sympathizers that were too old, too young, or otherwise unfit for frontline service had applied for this relatively well paid work. Nine thousand more were part-timers. Many of these men complemented their salary by stealing from the people they stopped to check.⁶⁴ In a small country where most people know each other, the local knowledge of militiamen often proved a useful supplement to informers. The SD solved the biggest bank robbery to date in the Netherlands quickly, by involving a local *Landwacht* man to identify one of the suspects, a resistance fighter from his village.⁶⁵ Friend and foe loathed the militia, but they provided augmentation. Towards the end of the war, there were more than enough Nazi security troops in the Netherlands, even without Dutch help. Since the Netherlands had become the front line of the Western Theater in September 1944, Germans and Nazi-collaborators, not just from the Netherlands but also from every other corner of Europe saturated the occupied zone in the north. A few of these Nazis who saw the inevitable coming started behaving more humanely; the vast majority seemed to become possessed and thrust the Netherlands into near apocalyptic misery.⁶⁶

The tactics of this Nazi security organization involved patrols, searches and checkpoints. Dutch people had to obtain special permits through the Nazi authorities for all vehicles, including bicycles, but the Nazis commandeered almost everything with wheels by 1944 anyway.⁶⁷

⁶³ Blood, *Hitler's Bandit Hunters*, 11-12.

⁶⁴ van Liempt, *De Jacht op het Verzet*, 178.

⁶⁵ Cor Cornelissen, *SIPO en SD in Twente* (Meppel: Hooiberg Haasbeek, 2010), 177.

⁶⁶ Van Liempt, *De Jacht op het Verzet*, 25.

⁶⁷ de Jong, *Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden 10a eerste helft*, 270.

Checks on these permits denied mobility to the resistance, who had to hide motor vehicles until needed for operations, and forge permits or enlist help from officials like medical doctors who had the few available ones. De-central security police headquarters, called *aussenstellen*, meaning outposts, acted as bases for resistance hunting teams. Police officers who had taken seat in the SD organization commanded the outposts. They employed a mix of German and Dutch military and police personnel, and they could recruit informants, so called *vertrauensmanner*, or *V-manner*, which means trusted persons. These units committed the worst war crimes in the Nazi-occupied Netherlands.⁶⁸ Many weak and malicious characters, in the end from all over Europe, found their way to these motley crews. Almost without exception, these war criminals consumed heavy doses of alcohol while performing their dirty work.⁶⁹ Especially towards the end of the occupation, accountability was lost and murder and torture went unchecked. These SD units caught resistance fighters, Jews, communists and many other people that were in the wrong place at the wrong time. The execution of hostages by the Nazi occupation force in retaliation for resistance acts became commonplace. The fourth section of this monograph will focus on this and other forms of terror to pressure the occupied Netherlands into submission.

The Allies and Dutch shelved their ambitions for the occupied Netherlands in the face of the strong Nazi security network, until their ground troops were close enough to support resistance. Instead of sabotage and uprising, the Anglo-Dutch secret operation attempted to shift to a campaign of assassination of Dutch collaborators. This would prompt less German retaliation, disrupt Dutch collaboration and clear the road for return of the old authorities. The Nazi- intelligence services intercepted the instructions during the *Englandspiel* and were able to prevent a centrally led effort.⁷⁰

⁶⁸ van Liempt, *De Jacht Op Het Verzet*, 21.

⁶⁹ Ibid., 28.

⁷⁰ Giskes, *London Calling North Pole*, 114.

The resident underground started its own assassination campaign against traitors however.⁷¹ In February 1941, the Netherlands spontaneously protested with a general strike against the first round of deportations of Jews from Amsterdam. The occupation forces broken the strike with violence. The Nazis subsequently removed eighty-thousand Dutch Jews with relative ease over the nine months leading up to April 1943. In addition to using fear to prevent interruption of deportations, the Germans masked the scale of this operation by a gradual approach. A wicked system of exceptions, which allowed some Jews to remain, created a pseudo rational narrative that provided a false sense of legitimacy.⁷²

During the last days of April 1943, a second spontaneous countrywide strike broke out in response to the forced labor draft and the revocation of parole for service members. *Hohere SS- und Polizeiführer* Hans Albin Rauter declared martial law and broke the strike in five days by letting his Police battalions shoot at any males present in the streets. The spike of resistance and the strike could not yet count on support from England and petered out. Jews and Dutch men went into hiding en masse to prevent their deportation. The massive amount of people hiding in basements, attics and behind false walls, Anne Frank being the most famous example, required an elaborate support network.⁷³ Secret organizations smuggled people across the country, found safe houses, and raided food stocks and ration offices.

Meanwhile the Allies stepped up their unconventional warfare, in support of the offensives to liberate the Netherlands. With so many Nazis swamping the Netherlands, Allied operatives and resistance fighters were extremely restricted in their movement and even just hiding passively was hard. Operating in uniform behind the lines was impossible in the Netherlands. The underground army started losing men and women at checkpoints and unlucky run-ins with Germans. Jedburgh

⁷¹ de Jong, *Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden 10b eerste helft*, 674.

⁷² de Jong, *Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden 6 tweede helft*, 846.

⁷³ By the summer of 1944 there were 200,000 to 300,000 people in hiding. Warmbrunn, *The Dutch under German occupation*, 188.

team Dudley parachuted in to support Operation Market-Garden. The crew of a police checkpoint arrested the local resistance leader that worked with the team, when they established that his papers were not in order.⁷⁴ Major Brinkgreve, the team Dudley commander, later stumbled into SS-men that came in to buy milk at the farm where he had his base of operations. He died in the ensuing shootout.⁷⁵ The SD raided a major resistance meeting in Utrecht, after the chance arrest of a courier with information about the meeting location on her person.⁷⁶ In the last year of the war, it was dangerous for men to be in the streets, or even at home at all. German forces could at any moment press into service anyone without credentials stating they already worked for the war effort. BBO-operative Louk Mulholland's assignment actually anticipated this, and his secondary mission was to start operations from Germany in case of deportation, which duly happened. His female courier alerted England when it happened and Louk later re-established contact from his position as forced railroad laborer. He used his position to conduct sabotage and steal mail.⁷⁷ Agent Joop Luykenaar also found himself rounded up together with a large group of men in a surprise raid on a street block in Rotterdam. He sought out the local Nazi-commander and showed him false credentials stating he worked on fortifications in the Netherlands. He bluffed himself free, pleading he had more value locally than at the men's destination, a factory in Germany.⁷⁸ In a transmission to London, BBO and resistance operatives voiced concerns about losing manpower to deportations and suggested strafing an expected block search with fighter aircraft.⁷⁹ In the same time, London instructed its agents to reduce both internal contact and wireless transmissions to avoid arrests.⁸⁰

⁷⁴ Cornelissen, *SIPO en SD in Twente*, 110.

⁷⁵ Hooiveld, *Operatie Jedburgh*, 123.

⁷⁶ de Roever, *Zij Sprongen Bij Maanlicht*, 74.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 181.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 184.

⁷⁹ Henri Koot, *Encrypted radio telegram to SOE London* (Amsterdam: sent by Pieter de Vos, 24 November 1944), accessed February 16, 2017, http://www.weggum.com/telegram_DRAUGHTS.html.

⁸⁰ Section Holland (SOE), *Encrypted telegram to Turnquoits, via Blythe direct* (London: 24 November 1944), accessed February 16, 2017.

One conclusion about the effectiveness of the German counter-unconventional warfare effort was that less intrusion in society is better. Co-opting existing Dutch authorities rather than replacing them with despised puppets worked well for the occupation force. Incremental implementation of the purge of Dutch Jews and a seemingly thought-through selection system also contributed to refrainment of resistance. At a lower level, seemingly harmless measures such as new identification documents and registration of vehicles yielded disproportionate control opportunities. The fact that not much could be kept secret in such a small, thickly populated country full of informants, also hindered secret operatives in the Netherlands. The invasion of the Netherlands caused a resentment that the Germans did not address. The countering of illegal press that kept this resentment alive did not have a high priority either. The empowerment of Dutch social outcasts by the Nazis contributed to the illegitimacy of the regime. The German removal of many young Dutch men from society, by internment, deportation and by pushing them into hiding, deprived manpower to the resistance. The resistance's preoccupation with the massive amount of people in hiding took the focus away from action against German occupation forces. The iron grip of the Nazis in general, and the fear it produced had the short-term effect of suppressing opposition. Of course, this also made life miserable for the average Netherlands citizen, which undercut what little sense of legitimacy there may have been at the beginning of the occupation. The Nazi behavior over the years of occupation more than anything else generated the spirit of resistance.

Intelligence Driven Operations

German counter-intelligence enabled by good interagency cooperation defeated Allied-Dutch unconventional warfare in 1941-1943. Within the German security operation in the occupied Netherlands there was a focused intelligence driven operation that caught on to the first Anglo-Dutch unconventional warfare attempt and destroyed it. The *Englandspiel* was one of the most

incredible intelligence coups of the war.⁸¹ The Germans thwarted the British “Plan for Holland” which should have created mayhem in the occupied rear. By capturing the first sabotage team and forcing them to cooperate without the SOE noticing, the German security services were able to capture all subsequent agents and supplies immediately upon landing in the Netherlands. At the high watermark of the operation, all fifty-four SOE operatives that made it to the Netherlands were in German captivity and their nineteen radios were feeding London with disinformation. The story of this England-game unfolded in the sequence of Anglo-Dutch action, followed by the German reaction that completely took over the initiative. Allied counteraction did not occur until the liberation of the Netherlands was near.

Starting within months of the occupation, the British and the Dutch tried to raise a secret army in the Netherlands. The British Special Operations Executive seized the initiative in 1941 by parachuting the first saboteurs into the Netherlands. Since the country was not a major planned Allied invasion ground and because it was very unsuitable for guerrilla warfare, it was not an SOE focal area like Yugoslavia or France. The goal nonetheless, was to create a Dutch underground army that would tie up large numbers of German troops to alleviate pressure from other theaters. This so-called “Plan for Holland” envisioned a thousand saboteurs and a secret army of five to ten thousand men. The resident Dutch resistance was to be incorporated into this plan.⁸² SOE’s rapid growth in its first year of existence meant that recruitment was hasty and some personnel entered that were not necessarily well suited to secret operations. The secret unit divided into country sections. N-section covered down on the Netherlands. Its commander and a number of the conducting officers, operations officers, and the signals officer of the section were Brits with a good understanding of the Netherlands because of prior careers or family affiliation.⁸³

⁸¹ Laurant Paine, *German Military Intelligence in World War Two* (New York: Stein and Day, 1984), 124.

⁸² Foot, *SOE in the Low Countries*, 131.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, 88-89.

Several of them spoke Dutch, but the agreed language for wireless traffic with their Dutch agents was English. The small Dutch expatriate community in England in 1940 delivered the first recruits, whom the Brits hastily trained and then parachuted into the Netherlands. Many of these first operatives were Netherlands armed forces junior noncommissioned officers and an occasional officer who were stranded in England. The first team that jumped in consisted of a saboteur and his wireless operator. They landed safely and started planning for sabotage operations. After making contact with local Dutchmen who were willing to resist, they made plans to arm this group with weapons and explosives that SOE would drop at request. Unfortunately, Nazi-informants had already penetrated the periphery of this group.⁸⁴

The German reaction to the covert incursion did not take long, and they intervened efficiently. German radio interception immediately noticed the wireless traffic from the sabotage team and sent out Nazi-Informants to probe suspected resistance circles. The *V-manner* offered “important information,” could anybody transmit this to England? An operation started, which was known in the German police and intelligence world as a *spiel*, meaning game. The method of such a game was to penetrate an enemy organization with an undercover agent to extract information and insert false information. The purpose was to neutralize an enemy covert effort, create deception, and in the best case get the enemy to spill important information. A *radiospiel* was a variant of a *spiel*. It entailed capturing agents with their radio sets unbeknownst to the enemy mother-organization, and then communicating with the enemy, as if his agent were still free.⁸⁵

Two dominant factors explained the German success of their *spiel* against the SOE: their interagency cooperation and intelligence tactics. Informant handling, signals interception and skillful interrogation of suspects were the tactics that achieved the success. Good interagency cooperation subsequently assured intelligence fusion and exploitation. Although the design of the

⁸⁴ Paine, *German Military Intelligence*, 132.

⁸⁵ Schreieder, *Het Englandspiel*, 27.

Nazi intelligence apparatus optimized rivalry and redundancy, the intelligence services, police and armed forces shared essential information and cooperated in the field during the *Englandspiel*. The German military intelligence service was the *Abwehr* (literally translated: parry). *Abwehr* sub-section *III-F* was responsible for countering enemy military espionage and sabotage. Hermann Giskes was the chief of the *Abwehr III-F*. The *Abwehr* directorate selected Giskes because his expected capability to stand up to the rival intelligence service, the *Sicherheitsdienst* (SD).⁸⁶

The separation of responsibility between the *Abwehr* and SD was very artificial and could easily lead to friction. The SD-section was responsible for countering sabotage and subversion coming out of occupied territory versus from England, but of course, any resistance overlapped in practice. The *Abwehr* only had intelligence-personnel and a small guard detachment without jurisdiction to make arrests. The SD therefore had to perform all the arrests, so whenever the *Abwehr* identified a suspect, they first had to pass this off to the SD. The cooperation between the two agencies started troublesome. When an *Abwehr V-mann* led to the first arrests of resistance fighters, the SD protested that they had not been involved enough in the preliminary investigation. They subsequently withheld the information necessary for the *Abwehr* to continue. It turned out the rival service had its own separate investigation into the same group.⁸⁷ Other problems showed internally within the SD. Sub-section IV of this service, with the specific task of fighting communism, interfered with their colleagues tasked with fighting general resistance. They arrested a communist resistance fighter, just as the other section's *V-mann* managed to become successfully engaged.⁸⁸ Giskes' direct counterpart in the SD was *Kriminaldirektor* Joseph Schreieder, a police officer who had worked as a detective in political counter-espionage in Bavaria before the war.⁸⁹

⁸⁶ Paine, *German Military Intelligence*, 129.

⁸⁷ Giskes, *London Calling North Pole*, 53.

⁸⁸ Schreieder, *Het Englandspiel*, 189.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 25.

Abwehr III-F chief Hermann Giskes deserves most credit for the successful cooperation between the German intelligence services and the armed forces during the *Englandspiel*. He accomplished something that few *Abwehr* officers achieved- an excellent working relationship with the rival SD.⁹⁰ He also brought on board other players within the occupation forces.

Cooperativeness manifested itself in four aspects: information sharing, collaborative planning, co-location and joint execution of operations. The *Abwehr* and SD sections developed regular meetings and provided each other with copies of relevant documents.⁹¹ Both the ORPO wireless monitoring service and the *Luftwaffe* provided the *Abwehr* with early warning and analysis about special flights. The Air Force radar picked up the single large aircraft known to drop agents. Because of Giskes' communication with the *Luftwaffe* these aircraft were not shot down until after they had dropped their agents and supplies. The air defenses did not shoot down all of the *Englandspiel* transports either; some were deliberately allowed to return in the hope that the attrition rate was acceptable yet credible for the British.⁹²

Giskes decided to move the *Englandspiel* headquarters from The Hague to Driebergen in 1943, to make operations and cooperation easier. He brokered a deal to get Schreieder's section in the adjacent house to the *Abwehr* station in this town. The *Luftwaffe* night-fighter command was already located in Driebergen. The resident Air Force commander conveniently lent his reconnaissance plane to Giskes, so he could more easily find additional drop zones for SOE. The town of Driebergen had a central position in the Netherlands, which made transit to the German-controlled drop zones and transmitters easier.⁹³ The co-location of three important agencies greatly enabled their collaborative planning. Schreieder and Giskes used ingenious planning aids to keep

⁹⁰ Paine, *German Military Intelligence*, 130.

⁹¹ Giskes, *London Calling North Pole*, 115.

⁹² Ibid., 120-121.

⁹³ Ibid., 117.

track of the *Englandspiel* and plan ahead. A large standing map board showed England and the Netherlands with all the SOE training locations, areas of operations and drop zones marked. Photos of captured agents could appear out of the frame of this board, while simultaneously illuminating all geographical data relevant for that operative. Aided by this interactive graphic overview, Giskes and Schreieder designed the future steps of the operation, war-gaming each following move.⁹⁴

Countering Special Operation Executive in the field required even further integration of even more organizations. An arrest on the drop zone involved as many as five agencies. The *Abwehr* did overall coordination and managed the *V-manner*; the *Ordnungspolizei* relayed any last coordinating measures from SOE's wireless traffic confirming the dispatch of agents. The *Luftwaffe* confirmed take-off of the British bomber and provided air defense, the SD subsequently made the arrest and performed the initial interrogation, and the army provided personnel to search and haul parachuted supply-containers around the drop zone. Coordination with coast guard, navy, air defense and army was necessary to ensure that vigilant night fighters, patrols, or sentries did not prematurely shoot the intruders. If the *Englandspiel* would be compromised at any point, the game could quickly turn into a fight. Assets such as air defense, patrol boats, and army personnel therefore stood ready to intervene.⁹⁵ Giskes staged resistance successes to prove to London that his fictitious guerrilla army existed. His hoaxes involved noisy yet harmless railroad sabotage, and even a spectacular explosion of a ship loaded with aircraft wrecks just outside the port of Rotterdam. These demonstrations always had sufficient audiences to cement the credibility. The Nazi-controlled press subsequently re-emphasized these dramas to increase the chance of the story reaching London.⁹⁶ Giskes enlisted the support of demolition experts and railroad, port and press-officials to support this mock guerrilla.

⁹⁴ Schreieder, *Het Englandspiel*, 178-179.

⁹⁵ Ibid., 65.

⁹⁶ Giskes, *London Calling North Pole*, 112.

The *Englandspiel* operation would not have been so successful without ingenious and well-executed intelligence tactics. Informant handling, interrogation skills, cryptology, electronic warfare, but mostly the crafty combination of it all led to success. Both the *Abwehr* and the SD made extensive use of Dutch informants to approach suspected resistance fighters. These informants lured clandestine fighters into exposing their network, including the Allied operatives that worked behind the lines. Most Nazi-informants volunteered their services; some were forced. Schreieder described the necessary characteristics of an undercover operator as non-corrupt, intelligent, quick thinking, good at establishing contact in relevant social circles and able to report without a distortion of the facts.⁹⁷ Schreieder handled his recruits personally. Informant Anton van der Waals became his primary *V-mann*. He caused particularly heavy damage to Dutch covert networks over the course of the war, delivering eighty-three people to the Nazis for arrest, thirty-eight of which they killed. The Nazis rewarded Anton well in money. His first infiltration earned him a bonus of five thousand guilders and within a year, he was making eleven hundred guilders per month; which was serious money for the day.⁹⁸ This monograph's introduction story featured Anton van der Waals. He posed as a secret agent using Arie van der Giessen's flashlight as an identifier.

Giskes had his parallel informant network. He worked through two contact handlers who were fluent in Dutch. Giskes described one of them, Willy Kup, as a born contact-handler because of his ability to approach anybody.⁹⁹ Kup quickly identified criminal "George" Ridderhof, as a potential informant. He had been involved in the illegal press and he had expanded his clandestine network during a stint in jail. A fellow inmate entrusted Ridderhof that he was keen on escaping to England, and that he knew the people that could help him do it. Ridderhof's first job as an

⁹⁷ Schreieder, *Het Englandspiel*, 15.

⁹⁸ de Jong, *Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden, 5 Tweede helft*, 877-879.

⁹⁹ Hermann Giskes, *London Calling North Pole* (London: Kimber, 1953), 46.

informant involved penetrating this escape network.¹⁰⁰ He subsequently volunteered to be a regular *Abwehr V-mann* for money. Giskes installed compartmentalization to ensure that the *V-mann*'s sensitive information remained contained. Kup reported only directly to Giskes or his deputy.¹⁰¹

Ridderhof was pivotal to getting the England-game started. He approached the fledgling illegal network that stood in connection with England through two of the first SOE operatives in the Netherlands. Ridderhof fed true but harmless information about German navy ship *Prinz Eugen* into this network. The next step in the game was the arrest of SOE-radioman Huib Lauwers, who would transmit this information to England. A combination of radio direction finding and the physical description provided by Ridderhof led to the radioman's arrest. Giskes tricked Lauwers into believing the Germans already broke this code by pretending to read-out the information from his last transmission, which was the information about the navy ship that Ridderhof inserted before, drafted by Giskes himself. He added in some details about Lauwers' code that a cryptology-specialist had already uncovered. The encryption seemingly already compromised, Lauwers gave up most of the secrets behind his radio cipher. When the Nazis threatened to kill his SOE-team mate if he would not cooperate, Lauwers agreed to transmit to England for the Nazis. Unbeknownst to the Germans, Lauwers had not given up his last line of defense, his security-check. This check consisted of a deliberate "mistake" in each transmission. The absence of the mistake should alert England to the fact that he was working under captivity. To Lauwers' dismay, London disregarded this last security measure.¹⁰² Thus began the *Englandspiel* with more and more saboteurs, radiomen and supplies dropped straight into German drop zones while German-controlled radios transmitted an elaborate fiction of successful resistance in the Netherlands.

¹⁰⁰ de Jong, *Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden, 5 Tweede helft*, 876-877.

¹⁰¹ Giskes, *London Calling North Pole*, 44 and 48.

¹⁰² Huib Lauwers, in "Epilogue" of *London Calling North Pole*, 183. Lauwers continued to warn London about his capture. During one forced transmission, he managed to work CAUGHT CAUGHT CAUGHT into the preliminary radio check under the nose of his German guard. The British failed to notice it.

A more direct way to get to Allied operatives behind the lines was to pinpoint their locations with signals intelligence. One of the agent's primary weaknesses was the radio link with England. Radio was the only quick way of communicating, alternatives of the day being carrier pigeons or couriers. Interception of radio-transmissions to England was easy. The messages were encoded however, and decoding was impossible without arresting and questioning the actual agent. Radio-interception was the responsibility of a specialized team within the *Ordnungspolizei* (ORPO), the order-police. The same team also enabled the playback operations to England later. Lieutenant Heinrichs was the police officer who led the direction finding section during the *Englandspiel*. Giskes described him as a highly trained security police officer, who was superlatively good at its job.¹⁰³ In the Dutch cities full of apartment blocks, this job was not always easy. To pinpoint Lauwers, the direction-finding team and the other services had to get creative. A *V-mann* posed as an electrician to cut the power for the different apartments in the block thought to harbor the agent. When the team heard an abrupt break in Lauwers' radio transmission, they knew precisely which house to search.¹⁰⁴ While this technical support and the successful direction finding methods were the ORPO's work, one of Schreieder's men, *Kriminalobersekretar* (detective) Ernst May was the decryption expert who broke the SOE code. He was also a patient interrogator.¹⁰⁵ Giskes and May cleverly manipulated Huib Lauwers and a large number of the subsequently parachuted wireless operators into giving up their codes. Pieter Dourlein, one of the few surviving *Englandspiel*-agents described how May would use his prior acquired knowledge about SOE cryptology to entice him into giving up essential details. Dourlein held out longer than most. After six weeks, he finally gave up his code, but without the correct security check.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰³ Giskes, *London Calling North Pole*, 19-20 and 107.

¹⁰⁴ Paine, *German Military Intelligence*, 136.

¹⁰⁵ Schreieder, *Het Englandspiel*, 43.

¹⁰⁶ Pieter Dourlein, *Inside North Pole*, 110-111.

The work of informants combined with intelligence from radio interception led to many arrests. To arrest the remainder of an underground network and to gain more information about wireless transmission procedures, the Germans used sophisticated interrogation techniques during the *Englandspiel*. Instead of the torture that captured Allied men expected, the counter-espionage and counter-sabotage sections under Giskes and Schreieder subjected their captives to lengthy and detailed questioning sessions, during which they manipulated the agents into giving up more information than they should have. Brutal violence against resistance fighters was commonplace elsewhere in the occupied Netherlands, but fortunately not during this phase of the *Englandspiel*. Interrogators could put the fear of violence that was already resident in most agents to good use however. When Giskes threatened Lauwers and his colleague with execution, Lauwers decided to give up his code to save his partner. Saboteur Pieter Dourlein's training in England convinced him that the Nazis would execute him in the end, which motivated him to attempt escape despite the odds.¹⁰⁷ Agent Jordaan remarked to the SD-chief that he had expected torture and felt it hard to deal with professional detectives.¹⁰⁸

Dutch police detectives Leo Poos and Marten Slagter were two other key *V-manner*. Their role was to act as the hoax reception party for Allied parachutists. They started the interrogation subtly, before the newly inserted operative realized he was about to be captured. These were the vulnerable moments when an agent was still exhilarated from the impressions of the night jump and by being back on native soil, behind enemy lines. Dourlein experienced this from the other side, and he was one of only three that lived to tell about it. While he still thought that he had successfully landed amongst fellow patriots, he fell for the role-playing collaborators' story. They told the new arrivals that their false IDs were inadequate and would get them arrested at the first Nazi-checkpoint. If they would give up their real names, resistance comrades could forge better

¹⁰⁷ Dourlein, *Inside North Pole*, 113.

¹⁰⁸ Schreieder, *Het Englandspiel*, 87.

copies using old Dutch records and stolen material.¹⁰⁹ For the Germans, this information of the first hour provided an enormous head start in the interrogation. Sometimes it revealed information that was essential to continue a credible England-game. The Germans used creativity rather than force here, using role-play instead of torture to get quick answers. Creativity also showed when agent Jongelie posed Giskes with a dilemma upon capture. Jongelie insisted that he should send a specific message to SOE within hours of landing, or they would assume his capture. Was he speaking the truth or was he trying to trick the Nazis into exposing the *Englandspiel*?¹¹⁰ Giskes came up with the option of the agent's fictitious parachute mishap. Another German controlled SOE transmitter reported the sad news of a gravely wounded Jongelie dying of injuries a few days after his hard landing.¹¹¹ Arie's flashlight as a verification for a rendezvous with a thus far unknown contact was an example.

During the main interrogation in prison, *Abwehr* and SD interrogators distinguished between a standard and a prolonged interrogation. The prolonged one was for tough cases and, according to Schreieder, could last up to four days and nights immediately following capture.¹¹² The *Sicherheitsdienst* seems to have subjected Dourlein to the long one. They deprived him of sleep for days, and shook him awake whenever he fell asleep during questioning. Schreieder mentioned how interrogators would use specific information already known to the interrogator to create unbalance in the agent. Dourlein admitted how he winced when his interrogator mentioned his emergency rendezvous. It shocked him to learn it was compromised. Detective May further surprised Dourlein by describing accurate details about persons and SOE training sites. He also walked Dourlein at gunpoint past the prison cells of the other captured agents to impress him with

¹⁰⁹ Dourlein, *Inside North Pole*, 100.

¹¹⁰ Jongelie did indeed try to raise the alarm, which Giskes prevented by his action.

¹¹¹ Giskes, *London Calling North Pole*, 108.

¹¹² Schreieder, *Het Englandspiel*, 135 and 138.

the failure of the operation.¹¹³ The Germans created an illusion of a betrayal within SOE in London to make uncooperativeness during questioning seem futile.¹¹⁴ Interrogators crafted the circumstances and timing of the interrogation to best get prisoners towards the point where “the ice was broken” and they would answer all further questions.¹¹⁵ Ernst May tried to use Dourlein’s smoking addiction to get him talking; he said Dourlein could have all the cigarettes in the world if he answered the question. May also tried to get him to talk about his codes by starting a conversation about sabotage, a subject Dourlein liked. Suddenly, when he thought the saboteur was in the right mood, he would switch back to cryptology and security checks.¹¹⁶ The elaborate interrogation of the operatives provided the *Abwehr* and SD with an almost complete picture of the SOE, and sufficient intelligence to hijack and operate its wireless network. Giskes and Schreieder asked for more agents and supplies at drop zones of their own choosing.

It took the British long to recognize the unconventional warfare debacle. When they finally did, they drew some hard lessons. SOE obliged the Nazis in the Netherlands for two years. Spillover effects occurred in Belgium, where the occupation forces emulated the *Englandspiel*, albeit on a smaller scale. The plot also exposed escape and evasion lines from the Netherlands to Spain.¹¹⁷ The England-game finally became untenable when agents Dourlein and Ubbink escaped from their prison in the south of the Netherlands, evaded back to England in 1943, and confirmed SOE’s worst fears.¹¹⁸ Giskes then ended the *Englandspiel* with a taunting message to London on April fool’s Day 1944, thanking the SOE leadership for their cooperation during the previous

¹¹³ Dourlein, *Inside North Pole*, 106-107.

¹¹⁴ Giskes, *London Calling North Pole*, 101.

¹¹⁵ Schreieder, *Het Englandspiel*, 135-136.

¹¹⁶ Dourlein, *Inside North Pole*, 108 and 110.

¹¹⁷ Paine, *German Military Intelligence*, 145.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 148.

years.¹¹⁹ The operation had exemplified intelligence driven interagency cooperation. Well-executed tactics in human intelligence, and signals intelligence, but especially the virtuous combination of these aspects led to the great German success.

An Allied reaction to the *Englandspiel* was of course absent during the operation, when SOE did not grasp the truth yet. When it finally hit, N-section halted operations in the Netherlands and the Dutch disbanded their covert sister-organization. The British did not regain trust in the Dutch resistance during the war and the Dutch distrusted SOE's design and intentions until well after the war. During Operation Market-Garden British distrust of the Dutch resistance showed by the hesitation to work with them. Quite contrary, the American troops maximized the use of the Dutch resistance through their attached Jedburgh team.¹²⁰

Covert tactics and security measures improved and despite the debacle a new Dutch unconventional warfare unit, the *Bureau Bijzondere Opdrachten* (BBO) the bureau of special missions, teamed up with SOE. The men and women of the BBO were mostly seasoned resistance fighters that managed an escape to England in the last two years of the occupation. Leo Marks, SOE's wireless code specialist, was the only one that had had any suspicion in London during the *Englandspiel*. He noticed that agents from all countries except the Dutch made encoding mistakes. His explanation for this was that stress-free Germans rather than stressed Dutch operatives were doing the encrypting and transmitting. The Dutch were also omitting their security checks, further pointing at their capture.¹²¹ Unfortunately, the head of N-section assured everyone that the Dutch operatives were fine and overruled Marks.¹²² When the disaster came out, Marks radically changed

¹¹⁹ Marks, *Between Silk and Cyanide*, 500.

¹²⁰ Hooiveld, *Operatie Jedburgh*, 138.

¹²¹ To verify his suspicion, Marks let a London radio operator insert the letters HH, for *Heil Hitler* at the end of an SOE message. The result he expected materialized: the German radio operator in the Netherlands returned the greeting immediately with his own HH.

¹²² Marks, *Between Silk and Cyanide*, 16.

SOE's encryption technique to make it less susceptible to hostile takeover. Transmission techniques also evolved. More narrowly focused, localized wireless beams pointed at receiving airplanes or boats made them harder to intercept.¹²³ Normal wireless radio still remained the most important means of communication, and because the threat of DF never abated, the Allies worked on keeping radio transmissions much shorter.¹²⁴

A large number of the next generation of operatives were seasoned resistance fighters who had survived the cut, fled to England to be trained by SOE and OSS, and were then re-inserted by parachute. These men and women had the character and skill to stand up to German checks and interrogations and convince them of their cover story. When the SD arrested Dutch OSS agent Anton Schrader, through a cunning ruse in 1944, he skillfully played Joseph Schreieder in turn. First, he convinced Schreieder that he was supporting a non-existing offensive in the north of the Netherlands. Next, he pretended to agree to work for the SD. He would feed false information to the OSS. During his transmissions, he secretly managed to slip in his emergency code, alerting his home station. In the last days of the war, Schreieder sent him through the lines to negotiate with the Allies. He made straight for the OSS headquarters in Paris instead.¹²⁵ Agents and resident resistance fighters hid in urban areas more than before and created spotter networks of innocent looking people such as children and older people. The home base of the German DF-trucks was under constant surveillance, so whenever one of the thirteen left, transmitters went silent. At one point, they even played the DF team, making them drive up and down town by alternating transmissions from different locations.¹²⁶ Agents and resistance also improved compartmentalization so that one exposed person did not necessarily lead to a chain reaction.

¹²³ Patrick O' Donnell, *Operatives, Spies and Saboteurs* (New York: Free Press, 2004), 213.

¹²⁴ Foot, *SOE*, 106.

¹²⁵ Paul van Beckum, *Oranjestad* (Naarden: Strenght's Boeken, 1992), 66.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, 137-138.

In conclusion, the negligence of the Anglo-Dutch clandestine effort amplified the excellence of the German intelligence driven operation. It seems naïve for SOE to expect that an unconventional war in the occupied Netherlands was feasible in the first stage of the war. The Dutch had not fired a shot in anger for over a hundred years, their government promoted a cautious strategy and the Nazi-occupation had not shown its true character yet. The necessary ingredients like Dutch enmity, expertise for a covert war and an aggressive policy were not there yet. The hurried training and deployment of Dutch SOE operatives and the negligence of security measures by N-section played into the hands of the Germans. Although the choice for English as SOEs language for radio traffic was understandable, English language mistakes in transmissions by Germans looked similar to those of a Dutchmen. The British never triangulated the Dutch radio traffic either. Had they done so, they would have noticed that all traffic came from either The Hague or Driebergen. The combination of these oversights and the pressure felt by N-section to deliver success, made them disregard suspicions.

The German interagency cooperation that benefited the *Englandspiel* so well seems to be largely to the credit of one person. Lieutenant-Colonel Giskes' networking skills allowed him to get a multitude of people to cooperate. He arranged for the co-location of the two counter-intelligence services in the town of Driebergen and managed others to give him information and resources, from reconnaissance planes and anti-aircraft artillery, to transportation assets and search parties. The German honed the tactics they used in the *Englandspiel* well before the war.¹²⁷ The undercover operations reveal proper selection of informants, their instruction and preparation before assignments, and thorough debriefing and reporting procedures by their handlers. Excellent operational security prevented information leakages or compromise. The background and experience of the men in the German security services explained their success in intelligence work.

¹²⁷ Schreieder, *Het Englandspiel*, 27.

They were already very experienced because the police had used *V-manner* and *spiele*- or “games” to infiltrate dissident groups in Germany in the interwar years.¹²⁸ Many men in the occupation forces in the Netherlands were militarized former police officers. Schreieder and key members of his team, such as interrogator and code-specialist Ernst May, and Lieutenant Heinrichs of the radio interception group, all had police backgrounds. Whereas SOE did not have access to Dutchmen that could look somebody in the eye while telling a lie when lives depended on it, the Nazis had no such problem. “Talented” men and women with backgrounds as criminals and with few scruples found their calling as undercover operatives. The German creativity and the combination of tactics were arguably even more impressive. The example of agent Lauwers’s arrest showed the creative combination of direction finding, undercover operations and interrogation. The exploitation of the flashlight on Agent Arie van der Giessen with an undercover operation, as well as the fictitious death of agent Jongelie also show the use of creativity where others might have opted for torture.

¹²⁸ Carsten Dams, *The Gestapo, Power and Terror in the Third Reich* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 2 and 66.

Reign of Terror

Harsh repression measures were a double-edged sword because it created as much resistance as it prevented. The Nazi use of terror delivered short-term control through fear, but people who suffered became determined to wait for their moment to strike back. The German retreat against the Soviet Union and especially the Allied invasion in Normandy made most Dutchmen realize that the Nazi-occupation was finite. As a result, Dutch resistance became bolder. In addition to this, the Allies intensified their unconventional warfare effort to support the liberation of the Netherlands. The lack of credibility of the Nazi-occupation defeated any narrative towards Dutchmen to submit themselves voluntarily any further. The Nazi-regime thus resorted to terror to keep the Netherlands in check. This was not a new development. Security warfare in the German army took shape in the nineteenth century. What was also taking shape over those years was a legacy of ruthlessness and the use of terror to make populations under occupation accept German rule.¹²⁹ The contest of wills became grimmer over time. When the Allies crossed the Dutch border during Operation Market-Garden, liberation seemed near and the resistance rose up, while crowds cheered on the Allies. When the offensive failed and the occupation dragged on for another year, the Germans did not forgive the Dutch and terror became the rule. The Allied counteraction had to consider Nazi retaliations to prevent unnecessary suffering and premature action.

Towards the liberation of the Netherlands, the combination of Special Forces and resistance became more active. The Market-Garden planners wanted to use the Dutch resistance strategically and tactically to assist the allied combat units during the operation. The Allies hoped that a general railroad strike by the Dutch would deny the Germans reinforcements via rail. Jedburgh teams organized and coordinated these actions together with the resistance.¹³⁰ The Dutch underground had recuperated from their decimation by the *Englandspiel*. Multiple local resistance organizations

¹²⁹ Blood, *Hitler's Bandit Hunters*, 21-22.

¹³⁰ Stewart Bentley, *Orange Blood, Silver Wings* (Bloomington: Authorhouse, 2007), 29.

developed grass roots. By the summer of 1944, so many branches arose that leaders finally organized countrywide coordination.¹³¹ The secret meetings in Amsterdam and Utrecht synchronized the efforts of different specialized groups such as the ones supporting people in hiding, to the ones performing sabotage and assassination. Though necessary, meetings were a liability. The Nazi raid on one such meetings on November 22, 1944 resulted in the capture and execution of the entire leadership of the central province's resistance.¹³² Despite such setbacks the underground strengthened because of the need to provide for the hundreds of thousands of people in hiding, and because the manifestation of the Nazi downfall motivated many people to join.

The last stage of the Dutch resistance was its transition into the Dutch Forces of the Interior under Prince Bernhard, Queen Wilhelmina's son-in law. This unification of all resistance after French example coincided with the liberation of Dutch territory starting with the ill-fated Operation Market-Garden. The process was by no means easy; although the first steps towards cooperation were underway, the myriad of different local groups often struggled against central command.¹³³ The Dutch Forces of the Interior sought to streamline the still divided underground and give the Allies a controllable force that could execute guerrilla actions, sabotage, protect infrastructure and support the illegal press. The task of training and equipping the Dutch guerrilla force mainly came to SOE's second Netherlands subcontractor, the BBO. Two Belgian SAS teams and inter-allied Jedburgh teams infiltrated days before Market-Garden to liaise with resistance groups to maximize their use for the offensive.

¹³¹ de Jong, *Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden 10a eerste helft*, 104.

¹³² van Beckum, *Oranjestad*, 52.

¹³³ de Jong, *Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden 10b eerste helft*, 656.

On the eve of the operation, the underground army stepped up railroad sabotage. During the offensive, resistance fighters acted as guides, reconnaissance units, and prisoner guards in direct support of the Allied troops. The Prince and Special Forces Headquarters, scarred by the *Englandspiel* were mindful of possible infiltration by *V-manner* in captured Allied uniforms.¹³⁴ Another major factor that had to be accounted for, was German reprisals.



Figure 2. Hard Times. Most of the Netherlands (Holland) remained under Nazi occupation for eight more months along the lines of this map after Operation Market-Garden failed in September 1944.

Source: West Point Department of History, accessed on February 14, 2017,

<http://www.westpoint.edu/history/SiteAssets/SitePages/World%20War%20II%20Europe/WWIIEurope71.gif>.

¹³⁴ Prince Bernhard, *Telegram to Special Forces Headquarters* (Sent from the liberated part of the Netherlands, 1944), accessed February 13, 2017, http://www.weggum.com/telegram_van_NORTHAW_191044.html.

In the last year of occupation, the Nazis subjected the Netherlands to a reign of terror. Leading up to the explosion of violence in the Netherlands around Operation Market-Garden, Nazi terror had already manifested itself increasingly. When the Allied juggernaut approached and unconventional warfare intensified, the Nazis tried to discourage any action behind the lines with more brutal reprisals. The Nazi use of terror had two schools of thought: very public execution of terror to discourage others or creating uncertainty as to the fate of the victims by letting them disappear. Hitler named the latter variant the *nacht und nebel* measure. This meant “night and fog” and spoke to the fact that dissidents would disappear unexplained to be executed.¹³⁵ Many executions and deportations in the Netherlands were explicitly public however. The Nazis published lists of death candidates in controlled papers. They would be executed in case of any resistance act. Many imprisoned clandestine fighters, including Allied agents, were on these lists. Hitler’s *Kommandobefehl*, a secret directive from October 18, 1942, stated that all special warfare operatives should be summarily executed immediately after interrogation.¹³⁶ In the Netherlands, the Germans often delayed execution until there was a reason for retaliation.

At the working end of the terror machine in the Netherlands, the Nazis used concentration camps, the shooting of hostages, the destruction of property and torture. With the normal prisons already full of high value inmates like resistance leaders, secret agents, and the Nazi’s own traitors, the concentration camps were meant for the mass of political and racial rejects. The purpose of the camps in general was not just to punish, but to terrorize the people and deter them from even contemplating resistance to the Nazi regime.¹³⁷ The three concentration camps in the Netherlands harbored a diverse population. There were people that had supported the resistance, or were caught

¹³⁵ William Shirer, *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich* (New York: Simon & Shuster, 1959), 957-958.

¹³⁶ Adolf Hitler, *Fuhrer Directive Nr. 003830/42 Gkdos./OKW/Wfst.* (Berlin: Fuhrer Headquarters, 1942), 53.

¹³⁷ Shirer, *Rise and Fall of the Third Reich*, 271.

hiding after being drafted for forced labor. There were also some Jews and other “unwanted elements” and there were criminals. The camps were not comparable with the infamous extermination camps, but conditions were still harsh and abuse was rampant.¹³⁸ The Dutch camps mostly served as transit camps. The Nazis transferred many inmates to the German and Polish ones, which usually equaled a death sentence. Another tactic was the destruction of property of suspected offenders. The best-known Dutch example was when territorial commander General Christiansen ordered the village of Putten razed to the ground after an attack on a German officer. The Nazis executed seven inhabitants immediately and deported 660 to concentration camps, where 544 died.¹³⁹

The killing of hostages by the Nazis to punish and discourage resistance by the population of occupied Europe was widespread. In the Netherlands, they executed about two thousand people to this end.¹⁴⁰ In August 1942, the Nazi leadership in the Netherlands sanctioned the shooting of five random men in reaction to an attack on a German troop-train. The modus operandi that stuck in the Netherlands was to create a death-row by rounding up *Todeskandidaten*, meaning death-candidates, shooting them unless the men responsible turned themselves in.¹⁴¹ After this incident, the Nazis always held enough death candidates hostage to retaliate immediately after any resistance, in an effort to prevent it. The gloves came off entirely when the Allies crossed the Dutch border, when specific communities deserved punishment. On the night of September 15, 1944, the Arnhem underground blew up the Schaapsdrift railway bridge. The Germans repaired the damage in less than a day and shot twelve civilians in retaliation. The railway strike and acts of sabotage throughout the Netherlands prompted mass arrests and many indiscriminate executions of Dutch

¹³⁸ de Jong, *Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden 10b, eerste helft*, 355

¹³⁹ Hirschfeld, *Nazi Rule and Dutch Collaboration*, 54.

¹⁴⁰ Shirer, *Rise and Fall of the Third Reich*, 957.

¹⁴¹ de Jong, *Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden 8 eerste helft*, 180.

civilians. The Nazis exacted retribution on inhabitants of Arnhem and Oosterbeek when Market-Garden failed. Throughout the area, SS and *Gestapo* units focused on finding members of the resistance who had assisted the Anglo-Americans.¹⁴² On October 24, 1944, the Nazis publicly executed twenty-nine civilians in Amsterdam while forcing passers-by to watch. This was in retaliation for an assassination of an SD-officer.¹⁴³ In March 1945, a resistance group gravely wounded Rauter and killed his orderly. Bizarrely, the guerrillas had not intended to attack the highest SS official in the Netherlands. Their actual goal had been to hijack a truck carrying six thousand pounds of meat, so they could feed people in hiding. Of course, to the Germans this was irrelevant. Himmler ordered the execution of five hundred Dutchmen. Soldiers of the *Ordnungspolizei* transported a hundred and seventeen hostages to the place of Rauter's ambush and shot them there. Again, Dutchmen had to watch the executions and the corpses. In other places in the Netherlands, additional hostages met their ends in a similar way, bringing the total death toll for this incident to two hundred and sixty-three.¹⁴⁴

The Nazis included a considerable number of imprisoned secret operatives in these retaliatory executions. This was in line with Himmler's instructions for *Sonderbehandlung* (special treatment) of captured secret operatives at the end of 1944, in case the SD had to leave in a hurry because of advancing Allies. The workings of this special treatment, which was a euphemism for execution, showed well at the prison of Zwolle. The SD imprisoned operatives and resistance fighters there under false names, so the resistance could not find and attempt to free them. When the Allies approached the town, Schreieder and May, who had fled to Zwolle along with many other prominent occupation personnel, made a list of prisoners who were no longer of intelligence value. Schreieder took two useful prisoners with him, OSS-agent Schrader and a civilian cryptology

¹⁴² Bentley, *Orange Blood, Silver Wings*, 60 and 120.

¹⁴³ de Jong, *Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden 10b eerste helft*, 370.

¹⁴⁴ Ruud Huyskamp, *Desperate Times, Desperate Measures* (Okanagan: University of British Columbia, Master's Thesis, 2011), 42.

specialist; the rest became subject to special treatment.¹⁴⁵ They died in different batches; shot in retaliation for the attack on Rauter and instances of railroad sabotage. Among them were a Dutch MI6 operative, two BBO agents and the Irish Sergeant Austin from Jedburgh team Dudley.¹⁴⁶ Eight more BBO agents imprisoned elsewhere died in other executions.¹⁴⁷

The battle of wills, of which terror was a part, needed media outlets to gain more effect. Like in Germany, the Nazi-controlled press in the Netherlands had the function of “instructing and guiding the population”, so only compliant Dutch press, usable for propaganda, survived. Papers would stress the Nazi patience with the Dutch and the inevitability of the execution of people that “failed to understand.”¹⁴⁸ To make the execution of hostages an even better deterrent in the small Dutch community, the Security services provided the names of death candidates and executed people to the press.¹⁴⁹ BBC Radio Orange and the underground press’ contrary voices obviously resonated better with the majority of the Dutch. The occupation forces therefore jammed the Radio Orange BBC broadcasts.¹⁵⁰ They also countered illegal printing, but despite losses, the Nazis were not even able to put a dent in production. More importantly, the credibility of the illegal prints were never in doubt, whereas Nazi propaganda induced ridicule and scorn.

The Allied counteraction to German terror in the Netherlands was to weigh cost and benefit before embarking on adventures. Unconventional action was timed to be supportable by conventional operations before Nazi terror could strike, or it could be made to look like something else than an act of resistance. At the highest Dutch level, Queen Wilhelmina was very mindful of

¹⁴⁵ Wolter Noordman, *De Vijftien Executies* (Utrecht: Omniboek, 2015), 16.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 31.

¹⁴⁷ de Roeper, *Zij Sprongen Bij Maanlicht*, 277.

¹⁴⁸ Hirschfeld, *Nazi Rule and Dutch Collaboration*, 119 and 127.

¹⁴⁹ Der Befehlshaber der Sicherheitspolizei und der SD, *Schreiben IV E/2 B.Nr.23369/42*, Den Haag, 18 November 1942 (Washington: National Archives and Records Service, Records of the German Army High Command, 1941, Microfilm).

¹⁵⁰ de Jong, *Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden 5 tweede Helft*, 792.

the executions of her citizens. In her speech on Radio Orange in May 1942, she mourned seventy-two executed Dutchmen and expressed her sympathy to their loved ones.¹⁵¹ In other speeches, Wilhelmina had already told her subjects that passive resistance was all they could do for the time being. In the Netherlands as well as with the Dutch government in exile in London, the fear of more executions took hold.¹⁵² In a letter to Prince Bernhard, the aggressive resistance leader Frank van Bijnen acknowledged the negative effect of guerrilla and sabotage. He complained that his group was losing the backing of fellow Dutchmen, because of German retaliations. The Allies and the Dutch government only encouraged sabotage when there was a chance to reinforce resistance on the ground, or when there was deniability. The Dutch Forces of the Interior realized that their subversive action would bring about German executions and the burning of houses. To prevent this, sabotage had to look like accidents, German negligence or actions by Allied Parachutists.¹⁵³ The Allies timed the final surge of unconventional warfare in the Netherlands to coincide with the Canadian ground offensive that would link up within days, so the Germans could not decimate the resistance and take revenge.¹⁵⁴ Secret operative Wim van der Veer described how resistance in his area decided against sabotage because the expected damage did not weigh up against the expected Nazi executions. When he finally took on the offensive in anticipation of the Canadian forces arrival, he learnt of six hostages, taken for his actions. To prevent their execution, van der Veer took his own hostage, a Dutch Nazi mayor, to exchange him against the six.¹⁵⁵ Other underground fighters attempted to thwart executions by staging numerous raids to liberate death candidates, with mixed success.¹⁵⁶

¹⁵¹ Queen Wilhelmina van Oranje, *Radiospeech on BBC "Radio Orange"*, London: 6 May 1942.

¹⁵² de Jong, *Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden 8 eerste helft*, 183.

¹⁵³ de Jong, *Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden 10b eerste helft*, 652 and 690.

¹⁵⁴ Mark Zuehlke, *On to Victory* (Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre, 2010), 264.

¹⁵⁵ Wim van der Veer, *Voor het Vaderland weg* (Haarlem: Gottmer, 1996), 223 and 269.

¹⁵⁶ de Jong, *Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden 10a eerste helft*, 298.

The brutal measures of the Germans discouraged immediate opposition, but fostered it in the longer term. The Nazi terror campaign in the occupied Netherlands had the intended short-term effect of discouraging unconventional warfare offensive action until the final liberation was very close. Allies and Dutch at all levels saw themselves forced to do a cost-benefit analysis before they decided on anything that the Nazis could attribute to the Dutch resistance and population. The underground spent time and resources on liberating and hiding hostages instead of focusing on the Nazis. On the other hand, the Germans lost any semblance of legitimacy. The illegal press easily won the battle of wills from Nazi propaganda. All but a small minority of Dutchmen alienated from the regime, and in the longer term, the enmity created by Nazi terror was probably the best recruitment asset to the resistance.

Conclusion

When agent Arie van der Giessen parachuted straight into the arms of a Nazi reception party made up of Dutch collaborators, the German counter-unconventional warfare effort was at the height of its success. The Nazi security services played the Dutch section of SOE for a fool, and the resident resistance went down in defeat with them. Arie escaped from prison twice. The Germans recaptured him a second time because a *V-mann* in the escape line betrayed him and his fellow escapee. Ernst May visited the two recaptured men in August 1944 to pass word unofficially that they would be liquidated the next day. The morning after, the SD shot Arie and the other agent “while attempting to escape.”¹⁵⁷ During the final stages of the war, the Nazis transferred all the other *Englandspiel* prisoners to Mauthausen concentration camp, where they executed all but one. By this time, the situation for the Germans was hopeless and the answer to everything had become terror. In this overall conclusion, selected theories of war, warfare, power, civil violence, and morality in warfare, as well as some current doctrine, shed more light on the three major dynamics of the unconventional struggle in the occupied Netherlands. First was the absence of hard struggle in the first year by prevention of antagonism through clever control. Second was the interception and destruction of unconventional warfare through intelligence and police work. Third, the loss of legitimacy through unacceptable and harsh control measures and the failure to convince the Dutch to join the *Reich*.

Theorist Carl von Clausewitz’s trinity could largely explain why the first period of the occupation went without hard struggle. Von Clausewitz argued that any theory of war should include the following trinity: enmity, the play of probability and chance, and subordination to policy.¹⁵⁸ The elements of this trinity were feeble in the occupied Netherlands and the Nazis were

¹⁵⁷ Foot, *SOE in the Low Countries*, 196.

¹⁵⁸ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, edited and translated by Micheal Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 89.

able to keep it like that for years. Initially the Nazis followed a relatively lenient strategy. They regarded the Dutch as Aryan brethren, left the old bureaucracy in place instead of installing the small and unpopular Dutch fascist party, and released all Dutch prisoners of war. This had the effect of inviting little resistance, despite indignation about Germany's uninvited entry. Instead of enmity, manifested mostly in the people of a country, most Dutch people displayed apprehension and shock when the Nazis violated their peace after more than a century. A lack of preparation for partisan warfare meant that the play of probability and chance, according to von Clausewitz mostly the realm of the creative military, was not mature in the Netherlands. In addition to the absence of suitable military leadership, the Dutch lacked weapons and supplies for an unconventional war. The third Clausewitzian element, the political reason that drove war, did not do much to stimulate a clandestine war in the Netherlands either. The government in-exile's policy breathed caution and passiveness. The German security operation of the first years managed to keep all elements of the Dutch trinity down with a number of effective measures, typified by incrementalism, deception and selective violence. Some seemingly inconspicuous measures such as additional identification obligations had far-reaching effects on the ability of the security apparatus to control the population. Another devious but effective trait of the operation was its incremental implementation, underpinned by a seemingly rational system of rules and exceptions. The gradual tempo and deceptive, seemingly non-invasive objectives, made the operation go unopposed by not invoking Dutch enmity, creative military action or aggressive policy.

The interception and destruction of the first Anglo-Dutch unconventional warfare effort in the occupied Netherlands showed skillful population control and focused targeting of the opponent. United States Joint Special Operations publications defined unconventional warfare as "activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and

guerrilla force in a denied area.”¹⁵⁹ Although coming from a 2011 publication, this description fitted what SOE and later organizations tried to do in the Netherlands. The goal was to disrupt the German occupation power, and the Nazis made the area even more denied than it already was. The German security operation used to its advantage societal dynamics that Stathis Kalyvas later theorized. There was potential to sow and exploit malicious dividedness in the occupied population. Even in a homogeneous society like the Dutch, interpersonal frictions stimulated denunciations and collaboration. Selective violence and control increased this tendency.¹⁶⁰ The Nazis used mostly selective violence in the first years, specifically targeting only actual opposition. Against this background developed the *Englandspiel*, when the Nazis had a dangerously effective informant network in a time when the Dutch trinity of war was weak.

The *Englandspiel* highlighted intelligence and police work, and interagency cooperation. Older and current theory and doctrine confirm the German patterns of excellence. Counter-insurgency theorist Roger Trinquier and a recent *White Paper* on counter-unconventional warfare both described some of the same mechanisms the German security forces used in the beginning. Trinquier stressed that actions in cities were essentially police operations. He also emphasized the necessity of a countrywide intelligence network, using informants.¹⁶¹ A United States Army Special Operations Command *White Paper* on counter-unconventional warfare argued for an interagency approach across all levels of war, preferably with SOF in the lead. It envisioned roles for law enforcement and intelligence too.¹⁶² Although a role for SOF did not become clear from the Dutch historical case, the role for law enforcement did. The striking similarity with police work in the way

¹⁵⁹ Joint Publication (JP) 3-05, *Special Operations* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2011), II-9.

¹⁶⁰ Stathis Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 145 and 351.

¹⁶¹ Roger Trinquier, *Modern Warfare, a French view of Counterinsurgency* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1964), 38-43.

¹⁶² USASOC White Paper, *Counter Unconventional Warfare* (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 2014), 15-20.

German counter-intelligence collected and exploited evidence, was no coincidence. The many militarized police officers in the German services used their experience and detective skills to combat SOE and the fledgling Dutch resistance movement. The usual internal strife within the Nazi security services was absent between the offices that dealt with countering unconventional warfare, by virtue of Hermann Giskes, the *Abwehr* chief. Collaborative planning and execution resulted in an operation that was also remarkably free of abuse, but rather used creative design to figure out the next steps in the game.

Current design and intelligence doctrine revealed best practices that the Germans used during the *Englandspiel*. Key concepts of design were critical and creative thinking, collaboration and dialogue, systems thinking, framing, visual modeling and narrative construction.¹⁶³ These concepts showed throughout the operation. Giskes and Schreieder created an approach, the storyline of their fictitious guerrilla, which then drove their detailed planning. These detailed plans guided actions from telegrams to parachute receptions. Skillful combination of human intelligence and signals intelligence resulted in arrests, which were themselves carefully synchronized so they did not betray German sources or the larger operation. Some of the tactics and techniques within the *Englandspiel* contributed disproportionately to its successes, specifically in counter-intelligence. Current doctrine almost identically described the human intelligence tactics that the *Abwehr* and SD used, from screening informants to interrogating prisoners. Especially the approach techniques to human sources read similar.¹⁶⁴ The collaboratively designed and well-executed operation was the German highpoint in the fight against unconventional warfare in the Netherlands.

¹⁶³ Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 5-0.1, *The Army Design Methodology* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2015), 1-5.

¹⁶⁴ The establishment of rapport in the way that will provide the best intelligence, whether that was by playing into patriotic feelings, appealing to personal gain, emotion or logic. From Field Manual (FM) 2-22.3, *Human Intelligence* (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 2006), 8-2.

The same theories that explained the initial German success also explained the gradual decline of the German security operation in the Netherlands. Additionally, Mao Tse-Tung's theory of guerrilla warfare, Joseph Nye's work on sources of power and Michael Walzer's book on morality in warfare clarified events in the final stages of the occupation. The Nazi rule over the Dutch degenerated into a criminally oppressive regime that disregarded legitimacy. The Nazi's Clausewitzian trinity started to fall short on policy and reason after about a year with a racial ideology that did not resonate with the Dutch. The management of probability and chance by the Nazi occupation forces did not display much creativity and stuck with the standard blueprint of German security warfare. This meant reacting to all opposition with ever-harsher control measures, indiscriminate violence and enlisting the help of the despised Dutch fascist minority. The operation relied entirely on coercion. Joseph Nye termed this hard power, based on commanding, coercing and threatening. He posited that nations should combine hard power with soft power such as co-option, attraction and persuasion to achieve lasting effects.¹⁶⁵ It is indeed hard to see how the Reich would have sustained a peace, other than by continuing repression for a thousand more years. Although the tight Nazi control suppressed resistance until the end, it also ceased to pave the way for an advantageous peace by alienating the occupied Dutch.

With the Allies on the doorstep, the Nazis discouraged the emboldened resistance by resorting to a complete reign of terror in the Netherlands. Methods were deportation to concentration camps, the execution of hostages, and the burning of houses. This indiscriminate violence was counterproductive. Trinquier wrote that terror was the tactic of choice to control a population, but he assumed that the insurgent would be the one using it. He stated how terrorism created distress because it shows a regime's inability to provide security.¹⁶⁶ In this case, however, the occupation forces were the terrorists. Kalyvas noted that when compliance to a regime did not

¹⁶⁵ Joseph Nye, *The Future of Power* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2011), 21-23.

¹⁶⁶ Trinquier, *Modern Warfare*, 16.

seem to guarantee safety, the opposition would become a more dependable alternative.¹⁶⁷ This is what happened in the Netherlands. In reaction to Nazi terror, 300,000 people went into hiding and the resistance started killing Dutch traitors.

Of all terror measures, the execution of death candidates tied most directly to resistance prevention. Reprisals would have been ethically problematic even if they had been proportionate and in support of a legitimate convention. However, one could defend lethal retribution as a means to deter enemy criminal excesses.¹⁶⁸ Unfortunately, the Nazis bothered themselves little with either proportionality or conventions. Instead, they used reprisals to enforce a criminal regime that had no right to be on Netherlands soil in the eyes of most Dutchmen. Nazi terror did suppress unconventional warfare in the short term though. The Allies and the Dutch resistance delayed many offensive actions until liberation was imminent, and even then, they weighed the odds critically. It also fanned fierce enmity in the Dutch, which provided a fertile support base for resistance.

The Nazis forced the Allied and Dutch unconventional warfare effort underground, but illegal press, hiding people and preparation for the liberation continued. A comparison between the Dutch predicament and Mao's strategic defensive came to mind. Mao Tse-tung envisioned three stages in protracted war: strategic defense, strategic stalemate and strategic offense. The first stage, the strategic defense was necessary when the enemy was vastly superior. This stage sometimes saw an aggravation of the defender's situation, but there could also be improvements. Among the positives were experience gained in war, political progress, the mobilization of the people, the emergence of guerrilla warfare, and the increase of international support.¹⁶⁹ The occupied Netherlands started without an organized resistance and without much will to resist. It ended with hundreds of thousands of people living underground, enabled by an illegal support network and

¹⁶⁷ Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*, 144.

¹⁶⁸ Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars* (New York: basic Books, 1977), 210-212.

¹⁶⁹ Mao Tse-Tung, *On Protracted War*, in *Selected Military writings of Mao Tse-Tung* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 1991), 215.

motivated by a thriving illegal press. A small but hardened cadre of fighters and secret agents defied the Nazi security forces and stood ready to support the liberation. The vast majority of the Dutch people above ground passionately supported opposition against the Nazis silently and awaited the Allies. The Dutch rejected German propaganda, while they trusted the illegal newspapers and the BBC. Although the Nazis punished supporters of people in hiding and the illegal press, these did not attract the same attention as armed resistance despite arguably being just as important. In the battle of wills, the Germans largely ceded the initiative to the Dutch by ineffectively contesting their safe havens and press. Increasing terror only pushed them away from their goal of integrating the Dutch.

The Germans countered the Dutch resistance and its allied sponsors using three interrelated methods. First, they established a security network to control the population. This worked best when it was least invasive and allowed some self-determination, forestalling Dutch enmity. Enabled by this tight control over the Netherlands, the Germans subsequently intercepted an Anglo-Dutch unconventional warfare effort launched from England. With superior intelligence tactics akin police methods, the Germans infiltrated and defeated an entire resistance network and designed a prolonged operation. They made extensive use of informants, exploiting subcutaneous tendencies of society. Finally, the Nazi occupation force resorted to terror to control the Netherlands in the face of a losing war. While this suppressed resistance in the short term, it roused enmity in the long term and bred a small but tough resistance cadre that assisted the Allies.

Some of these findings held value for the present day. The initial incremental approach that combined hard and soft power aspects deserved attention. The interagency cooperation, design, police integration and the intelligence tactics of the *Englandspiel* were also noteworthy. Considering the Dutch did not perceive any just cause in the German invasion and occupation. The initial relatively lenient, inclusive and non-abusive occupation strategy enabled control of the Netherlands quite well. Soft power like co-option and persuasion functioned alongside hard power

like coercion. In this first stage, the occupation regime implemented restrictions incrementally, which invited little opposition. Later when the Nazis lost grip, they compensated with harsh coercion, which only enlarged the gap between the Germans and the Dutch for lack of legitimacy. The lesson is that to keep an opponent calm, he should be convinced there is a large enough measure of self-determination and justice in the bargain.

The operation to find and capture resistance fighters and foreign operatives demonstrated the utility of design, an interagency approach, and especially the integration of police. The subtle exploitation of divisions within society to secure information worked well, but its over-use decreased legitimacy. The biggest German success against the Allied-Dutch opposition highlighted a prolonged operation, creatively designed for continued collection of intelligence, prisoners and contraband. Although sadly the terror frenzy in the final stage of the war final cost most prisoners their lives, the effort stood out by the absence of torture. Instead of abuse, The Germans used patient interrogation and creative manipulation of the opponent. Militarized police officers brought the necessary judicial mindset and investigation techniques to the fight. Their use of informants successfully exploited the tendency for denunciation in societies in a discreet way. The operation's selective violence was proportionate, whereas later indiscriminate violence drove the population into the opponent's arms. Nazi co-option of a hated minority to bolster the uniformed services added to a perception of illegitimacy and created friction and violence of its own in Dutch society. The potential in society to secure denunciations showed clearly, as did the need to handle it subtly. The Dutch case highlighted the advantage of integrated police investigators in too.

With findings came more questions. Did the German occupation forces fail to focus on the Dutch illegal press and the people in hiding, essentially the resistance's safe haven? Did the armed resistance distract them that much, or did they not recognize the value? Another question is why Nazi propaganda gained so little traction on the Dutch. Was it culturally unsuitable? Did the illegal press contest it that effectively? These questions would require additional research.

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